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Abstract. New potential high-growth firms, for example new technology-based ventures, represent the vast majority 
of economic growth and job creation caused by new firm creation. However, these firms often experience difficulties 
in raising a sufficient amount of capital, which justifies governmental intervention. We provide an overview of 
difficulties associated with the financing process of potential high-growth firms, and introduce a holistic, conceptual 
framework, illustrating the dynamics between supply-side and demand-side intervention in private capital markets. 
Furthermore, we study two demand-side programs that increase firm quality through value-adding activities provided 
by ‘industry professionals’. We examine how these programs  (1) are able to ‘pick winners’ at such early stage of a 
firm life cycle, (2) ‘make winners’ through providing business support that reduces firm uncertainty, making them 
investor ready, and (3) ‘sell winners’ through reducing information asymmetries in the investment process and 
trigger investments from private equity investors. Based on our insights, we revise our framework and provide policy 
makers a conceptual model that can help them identify constraining factors and design schemes thereafter. We argue 
that governmental programs need to be designed in a ‘value chain’ of programs that address different stages in the 
life cycle of early stage companies. Furthermore, industry professionals need to be attracted and incentivized to 
participate in demand-side programs as they have the ability to identify and tackle crucial areas of firm uncertainty. 
Lastly, we argue that a significant amount of funding is necessary to produce significant contributions suggesting 
that policy makers should prioritize a small number of firms when designing programs with the purpose of fostering 
high-growth firms. 
 
 
Sammendrag. Nye bedrifter med stort vekstpotensial står for brorparten av vår økonomiske vekst. Likevel opplever 
denne typen bedrifter ofte problemer med å tiltrekke seg nok tidligfasekapital, noe som kan rettferdiggjøre statlige 
inngrep for å øke kapitaltilførselen. I denne studien gis det et overblikk over utfordringene tilknyttet 
finansieringsprosessen av bedrifter med stort vekstpotensial. Det introduseres et holistisk, konseptuelt rammeverk 
som illustrerer dynamikken mellom ’demand-side’ og supply-side’ i private kapitalmarkeder. Videre studeres det to 
demand-side-programmer som har som mål å øke bedrifters kvalitet gjennom verdiskapende aktiviteter tilført 
av ’eksperter’ med lang bransje- og industrierfaring. Det studeres hvordan disse programmene (1) klarer å ’plukke 
vinnere’ in en så tidlig fase i en bedrifts livssyklus, (2) ’bygge vinnere’ gjennom tilførsel av forretningsutvikling som 
reduserer usikkerhet knytte til bedriften, derigjennom gjøre de ’investor ready’, og (3) ’selge vinnere’ ved å redusere 
informasjonsasymmetrier mellom entreprenører og investorer, derigjennom øke investeringsviljen- og aktiviteten i 
det private kapitalmarkedet. Basert på data fra denne studien revideres det initielle rammeverket. Resultatet er et 
verktøy som kan hjelpe politikere og andre policy-utformere med å identifisere utfordringer knyttet til utforming av 
nye tiltak. Det argumenteres for at statlige tiltak må settes opp i en ’verdikjede’ av tiltak som retter seg mot og 
dekker ulike deler av en bedrifts livssyklus.  Videre må eksperter med lang bransje- og industrierfaring, typisk 
tidligere serieentreprenører, tiltrekkes og bli gitt incentiver for å delta i demand-side programmer, nettopp fordi disse 
har evnen til å identifisere og takle avgjørende usikkerhetsområder i en bedrifts tidligfase. Det argumenteres for at 
signifikante mengder tilført kapital er nødvendig for å tilføre signifikante bidrag, noe som tyder på at politikere bør 
prioritere et mindre antall bedrifter og tilføre disse mer midler når programmer som spesifikt retter seg mot nye 
vekstbedrifter utformes. 
 
 1 
Preface 
This master thesis is the work of Henrik Tveit and Alexander Nietzold. The authors are currently pursuing 
their M.Sc. degree in Entrepreneurship at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), 
attending the NTNU School of Entrepreneurship. This thesis is based on research conducted in the period 
February – July 2014. 
 
This thesis has been sponsored by SIVA - The Industrial Development Corporation of Norway. The 
purpose of this thesis is to draw lessons from two internationally renowned demand-side programs, 
however, to do so with extensive theoretical grounding. The authors believe that these types of 
‘evaluations’ are too often conducted without any theoretical understanding of the problem, leading to a 
poor understanding of the underlying problems and challenges. 
 
The authors hope and believe that the insights gained from this research can help policy and decision 
makers to gain a better understanding of the challenges related to designing demand-side programs, as 
well as a tool for making much needed change in Norwegian entrepreneurship policy. 
 
We wish to thank our supervisor, Professor Roger Sørheim at the NTNU Department of Industrial 
Economics and Technology Management, for invaluable support, feedback and encouragement. Professor 
Sørheim has provided vital guidance throughout conducting this research, helping us shape our research 
and sharpen our objectives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trondheim, 20.06.2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         _________________________                _________________________ 
                Alexander Nietzold       Henrik Tveit 
 
 2 
Introduction 
An OECD Economic report from 2014 notes that Norway may face the danger of the «Dutch disease» if 
the benefits from the petroleum industry were to diminish more rapidly than expected, and raise attention 
to entrepreneurship policy to maintain and improve Norwegian productivity performance. Enterprise 
creation is lower in Norway than in most OECD-countries. Furthermore, Norway has a below average rate 
of new companies that turn into high growth companies (OECD 2014), which are the ones that represent 
the vast contribution to job creation and economic growth (Shane 2009).  
 
Firm growth rate is dependent on the financial capital of the firm, and young firms that make use of 
external financing grow significantly faster than those who don’t (Carpenter & Petersen 2002b).The 
process of acquiring external funding is however often a significant challenge for entrepreneurs (Cressy & 
Olofsson 1997; MacMillan (1931) reffered to in Frost 1954). Uncertainty and information asymmetries 
impede the financing process for new ventures (Sørheim et al. 2011), especially for New Technology 
Based Firms (NTBFs) with high growth ambitions (Lindstrom & Olofsson 2001; Murray 2007; Binks & 
Ennew 1996), causing what is commonly known as the financial gap.   
 
When NTBFs with growth potential, which have the potential to produce considerable benefits for the 
domestic economy, face impediments raising the adequate amount of funding from private capital markets, 
a market failure is present and governmental intervention is justified (Lindstrom & Olofsson 2001; Shane 
2009; Murray 2007; Cressy 2002). The low number of initial seed investments in Norwegian enterprises 
made by private equity firms, five in 2013 (NVCA 2014), indicate that these financing constraints are also 
present in Norway. Presuming this is true, more effective policies targeting market failure should be 
created. 
 
Traditionally, most governmental funding schemes have addressed a lack of capital in the market (supply-
side constraints), while other, relatively younger, initiatives address entrepreneurs’ abilities to provide 
attractive investment opportunities (demand-side constraints) (Cressy & Olofsson 1997; Mason & Kwok 
2010). Supply-side intervention can be useful when the pool of private capital available for investments is 
insufficient and there is a need to stimulate investors to make uncertain investments that they would not 
make with private money (Nightingale et al. 2009). However, fostering more high growth firms entirely 
through supply-side initiatives is not going to increase the actual quality of the firms. Without a steady 
stream of high potential, investment ready firms, the increased pool of capital is likely to be allocated to 
low quality firms (Armour & Cumming 2006).  Lessons from the UK show that investors are unable to 
invest as much as they would like, meaning the amount of capital is sufficient (Mason & Harrison 2001). 
Many governments have acknowledged that the key issue for young companies is to gain access to the 
investors’ readily available capital (Lundström & Stevenson 2005). However, the majority of academic 
research in the process of new venture financing has focused on supply-side measures (Rasmussen & 
Sørheim 2012b).  
 
A well-known demand-side scheme that is a widely known tool for economic growth is the ‘incubator’ 
(Bergek & Norrman 2008), a term used for a range of organizations that differ in both concept and 
objective (Aernoudt 2004; Bøllingtoft & Ulhøi 2005). A strand of incubators within this umbrella term 
(Aernoudt 2004), is private for-profit incubators that provide financial and non-financial support in 
exchange for capital that they aim to capitalize on (Grimaldi & Grandi 2005). The activities of such 
incubators are quite well documented (Bergek & Norrman 2008), but it is argued that researchers need to 
turn their attention from ‘what’ the important activities are to ‘how’ and ‘why’ these activities are 
interrelated, as well as to focus on the incubation process and the incubatees involved  (Hackett & Dilts 
2004b). As some governments have developed programs that use private for-profit incubators as a tool for 
demand-side intervention to promote high growth firms, an understanding how these well-documented 
activities target the financial constraints for these firms is needed. Indeed, (Lundström & Stevenson 2005) 
argue that demand-side programs should apply a bottom-up approach, targeting the underlying 
deficiencies that represent their raison d’être.  
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Investors require companies to have reduced their uncertainty to a certain level, thereby becoming investor 
ready, before an investment is made (Douglas & Shepherd 2002; Dimov & Murray 2008). Information 
asymmetries make it difficult for them to distinguish the good firms from the less able firms (lemons) 
(Akerlof 1970). These are therefore issues that governmentally sponsored incubators should address. In 
addition, the same problems apply for the incubators when they select which companies to select for 
incubation. Identifying which companies should be supported in the very early stage is considered as a 
highly challenging task that even experienced investors fail at (Shane 2009; Mason & Brown 2013). 
Taken together, it is therefore appropriate to ask:  
 
Q1 ‘Picking’ winners: How can incubators, as demand-side initiatives, «pick winners» at such early 
stages of the firm’s life cycle? 
 
Q2 ‘Making’ winners:  How can incubators, as demand-side initiatives, reduce uncertainty related to 
new ventures, so that they become investor ready? 
 
Q3 ‘Selling’ winners:  How can incubators, as demand-side initiatives, reduce information asymmetries 
between new ventures and investors, thus increasing the investors perceived 
quality of the firm? 
 
We study two demand-side programs, the ‘Israeli Technological Incubator Program’ and the Finnish 
‘VIGO Accelerator Program’, which report promising results by using private, for-profit, incubators to 
support promising high-growth firms. Through a multilevel study, including interviews with policy 
makers, incubator managers and portfolio companies, we assess how and why they work. Finally, 
implications for policy makers, investors, and Norwegian government agencies in particular, are provided.  
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Theory development 
In order to successfully address the capital gap experienced by potential high-growth companies, it is 
crucial to understand the underlying problems leading to a market failure (Lundström & Stevenson 2005). 
Information asymmetries 
‘Information asymmetries’ is a term used for circumstances when there is a gap in information possessed 
by the demand side and the supply side.  In the most obvious sense, entrepreneurs may be unaware of 
potential investors, and investors with available capital may be unaware of existing ventures that fit their 
investment profile (Hayton et al. 2008). Investors and entrepreneurs searching for and identifying each 
other may therefore incur significant transaction costs (Nightingale et al. 2009).  
 
However, information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and investors are also hampering the financing 
process after a connection has been made. For example, an entrepreneur might be reluctant to reveal all 
information about a venture to investors, as it is the key to its competitive advantage (Shane & Cable 
2002). Information asymmetries pose a line of issues for private investors (as well as for banks), which 
lead them to require a higher rate of return on the investments (Hall & Lerner 2009), partly leading to a 
higher cost of capital for the entrepreneurs (Carpenter & Petersen 2002a). Some issues can in a simple 
way be explained by the “lemons” problem:  
 
Consider a simplified car market in which there are two types of cars: ‘Good cars’ and ‘bad cars’ (the 
latter known as “lemons”). When buying a car, the buyer might have an idea of whether the car is a good 
car or a lemon. However, after having bought the car, the owner gets a better idea of which category it 
belongs to. When selling the car to a new buyer, the seller will therefore have more information about the 
state of the car than the buyer. But since the buyer does not have the same information, the price of the car 
will be the same, regardless of it being a good car or a lemon. An owner of a lemon will more often than 
other car owners have a desire to sell the car to be able to buy a car that has a better probability of being 
good. With more lemons present in the market and with an equal price of good cars and lemons, owners of 
good cars cannot expect to get a price that reflects the real value of the car. They will be locked in, and 
lemons will drive the good cars out of the market (Akerlof 1970).  
 
These information issues can also be applied to the investment process. As in the case of good cars and 
lemons, owners of ‘good ventures’ selling equity to investors compete with ‘lemon ventures’. It is a 
challenge to effectively assess investment opportunities, especially when the products and services do not 
yet exist and may even have complex characteristics that are hard to comprehend by both investors and 
end-users (Murray 2007).  Entrepreneurs also have a predisposition to be overconfident and overestimate 
their likelihood of success (Koellinger et al. 2007). When an investor is presented to a viable venture, 
information asymmetries make it difficult for the investor to recognize it as a good venture instead of a 
lemon. Good ventures and seemingly similar lemons will be offered the same terms by the investors, 
leading the good ventures to pay a higher cost of capital than what their equity is worth. According to the 
lemons-problem, the good ventures will therefore not accept the high cost of capital when competing with 
lemons, and lemons will eventually dominate the marketplace.  
 
In addition to the lemons-problem itself, the car market analogy also illustrates the adverse selection 
agency problems that emerge under information asymmetry.  Adverse selection refers to difficulties in 
interpreting the abilities of an agent (Eisenhardt 1989a), in this case of an entrepreneur. The entrepreneur 
may claim to have abilities or experience that he or she not possesses to increase the probability of 
receiving investments, which makes it difficult for the investor to distinguish between able and less able 
entrepreneurs (Sahlman 1990). Furthermore, the entrepreneur can engage in opportunistic behavior by 
holding back information that can adversely affect the perceived attractiveness of the opportunity or the 
entrepreneur. Such opportunistic behavior increase the likelihood of receiving funding compared to other 
entrepreneurs (Shane & Cable 2002).  
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Another agency problem related to information asymmetries is the moral hazard problem, in which the 
goals of the principle and the agent are in conflict (Hall & Lerner 2009). The entrepreneur can decide to 
neglect his or her duties and partially divert the capital flow to private ends.  In a more general sense, the 
entrepreneur might not put down the effort that is initially agreed upon and that is required for efficient 
application of the investment. Thus, the effectiveness of the invested capital is reduced (Bergemann & 
Hege 1998).  
Risk and uncertainty 
New venture financing also poses a variety of risks for the investor (and the entrepreneur): Managerial 
risk, technology risk, market risk and financial risk must be taken into account (Murray 2007). 
Entrepreneurial activities that search for opportunities to create and appropriate entrepreneurial rents also 
lead to investments in settings characterized by uncertainty (Alvarez 2007). An uncertain investment is 
unquantifiable, in the sense that the probability distributions and possible outcomes are unknown (Knight 
1921 reffered in Sørheim et al. 2011). Therefore, traditional portfolio theory and risk/reward assessment 
cannot be made, thereby making it rational for investors to not invest in an uncertain company (Dimov & 
Murray 2008). Indeed, increasing levels of uncertainty increase the cost of the investment for investors 
and reduce their willingness to invest (Sørheim et al. 2011), explaining the low number of seed 
investments compared to later stage investments made by Norwegian VC firms (NVCA 2014).  
New Technology Based Firms (NTBFs) 
Not all new entrepreneurial firms have a positive effect on the economy. In fact, a small portion of high 
growth ventures contributes to the vast majority of job creation and economic growth accounted for by 
entrepreneurial activity (Shane 2009). However, firms that expect to grow also perceive larger difficulties 
in obtaining external financing (Binks & Ennew 1996). New technology based firms (NTBFs) experience 
both larger financial contraints than firms with less novel technology, but also a significantly higher 
growth later on (Lindstrom & Olofsson 2001). High-tech investments involve greater uncertainty than 
low-tech investments, which as mentioned reduces investors’ willingness to invest. The uncertainty is 
composed by the technological feasibility and whether there exists a market for the new technology 
(Murray & Marriott 1998). Furthermore, information asymmetries are larger when new technology is 
involved. New technology often involves new knowledge, which makes it more frequent that the 
entrepreneurs have more information about the firms’ prospects compared to the investors. NTBFs are 
generally characterized by long and costly technical development (Murray 2007), which lead them to 
having a larger need for capital. The long technical development also makes it difficult and costly to 
signal the quality of the venture, therefore more difficult for good NTBFs to distinguish themselves from 
less able «lemon» firms. For example, investors prefer to see a well-working prototype, initial sales or 
other evidence of a market-need before they invest (Douglas & Shepherd 2002). To reach a stage, in 
which it is possible to provide investors with such signals, is both time-consuming and costly for NTBFs 
in their early days.    
How investors deal with information asymmetries and uncertainty 
The pecking order theory explains that new firms should prefer debt financing over equity financing 
(Myers & Majluf 1984), but as most financing for NTBFs are used for salary payments, which does not 
fulfill the collateral value that most banks require (Carpenter & Petersen 2002b; Hughes 1997). 
Furthermore, banks only take part in the downside risk and not the return, which make debt less applicable 
for NTBFs than equity financing (Cressy & Olofsson 1997; Paul et al. 2007).  
 
Private investors issuing equity use a series of “tools” to deal with the problems of information and 
uncertainty that are present in the investment process.  Investors can limit the information problem 
through due diligence of investment opportunities before making a deal, and monitoring of the company 
after a deal has been made (Lerner 2000). Investors also use social ties to acquire information that reduce 
agency problems and to identify opportunities (Shane & Cable 2002; Sørheim 2003). For NTBFs, due 
diligence becomes more difficult in areas concerning leading technologies as few, if any, people can 
validate the technology related to the opportunity. Furthermore, expert entrepreneurs in technological 
ventures are rarely equally competent in business, which imposes particularly high agency cost through 
management support and guidance (Murray & Marriott 1998). 
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Venture capitalist funds rely especially on tools to limit information asymmetries, such as thorough due 
diligence, deal negotiation and monitoring (Van Osnabrugge 2000). A venture capitalist often requires a 
seat on the investee firm’s board of directors, and contract compensation schemes with managers, 
including incentivizing stock options, but also dilution schemes if the company fails to meet agreed upon 
targets (Gompers & Lerner 2001). When investing in NTBFs, the investors can expect that the investee 
firm will require follow on financing, increasing the total investments to portfolio firms. In addition, the 
great uncertainty related to new ventures results in a need for the investors to diversify their investment 
portfolio, aiming at one or a few major successes among several investments (Murray & Marriott 1998). 
Aggregating the tools to overcome information asymmetries, agency problems, risk and uncertainty, the 
total governance costs carried by venture capital firms is not only high, but also fixed, regardless of the 
size of the individual investment (Murray 2007). Early stage seed investments are therefore not only more 
uncertain than later stage investments, they also incur the same transaction costs, but with the 
disadvantage of a longer timespan to a potential divestment. Larger and more diversified portfolios allow 
VC firms to make a larger number of more risky seed investments, but only up to a certain scale as the 
governance cost of managing a larger portfolio exceed the expected return from the seed investments 
(Dimov & Murray 2008). Thus, it is a rational decision for VCs to mainly invest in later-stage companies.  
 
VCs reluctance to make smaller investments create resource difficulties for ventures in the very early 
stages; however, a different breed of investors are said to fill this gap: Business Angels are typically 
wealthy and well-educated individuals that invest their personal capital in new ventures (Feeney et al. 
1999; Wetzel 1983; Mason 2007). They invest sums that are larger than what the entrepreneurs can raise 
from internal sources, but still smaller than the VC minimum investment threshold (Mason 2007).  They 
do use similar evaluation criteria as VCs, but tend to use a less rigorous due diligence process and do not 
rely on contracting to the same extent as VCs (Van Osnabrugge 2000), thus reducing the high governance 
costs experienced by VCs to some extent. Well reputed Business Angels can also facilitate further 
financing, by making referrals to other business angels, VCs, or even banks (Sørheim 2005). However, 
they often prefer to stay anonymous, and leverage friend or business networks to identify investment 
opportunities (Wetzel 1983; Sørheim 2003). In comparison with venture capitalists, business angels are 
therefore less visible to both entrepreneurs and governments.  Business Angels are able to invest at an 
earlier stage than VCs, but the information problems are significantly larger for the entrepreneur if the 
amount of Business Angels is limited.  
 
Even though from the investors’ point of view, it may be a rational decision to not invest in a firm because 
of large information asymmetries and uncertainty, the firm may have the potential to represent significant 
benefits for the domestic economy, and governmental intervention is justified (Murray 2007). Problems 
such as investors high-risk aversion and the tendency to prefer later-stage companies, exist independently 
of the companies, and are commonly labeled supply-side constraints (Cressy & Olofsson 1997). 
Governmental supply-side programs typically target these by investing as limited partners in funds, either 
100% or co-investing with private actors. Some governments also provide guarantee schemes, buy-back 
options of governmental stocks or tax incentives to encourage investments from private actors (Wright et 
al. 2007). The rational behind such schemes is to increase private investors’ acceptance of risk and 
uncertainty in order to trigger investment that a rational investor not would do on its own.  
How entrepreneurs can reduce information asymmetries 
Entrepreneurs can also increase a private investor’s willingness to invest by reducing the asymmetric 
information between themselves and investors. Investors rely on their direct and indirect ties to obtain 
information and advice about investment opportunities, which usually is information that is nonpublic and 
costly to obtain. For example, referrals through indirect ties provide information about competences, that 
is difficult for an investor to observe (Shane & Cable 2002). Furthermore, a third party can be a mediator 
of trust in the relationship between investors and entrepreneurs, especially if the third party has incentives 
to provide credible advice to the investor, thereby reducing the perceived danger of opportunism and 
moral hazard problems (Shane & Stuart 2002). Therefore, entrepreneurs need to develop their network 
and provide it with information about the investment opportunity their company represents. Indeed, the 
relationships and networks of the entrepreneur are of great importance when obtaining financing 
(Rasmussen & Sørheim 2012b).  
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Information asymmetries can also be reduced in other ways than through explicit information transfer in 
social ties. Good ventures can distinguish themselves from “lemon” ventures through signaling. For 
example, entrepreneurs can signal commitment and reduce the moral hazard problem, through firm 
ownership, in which the proportion of the entrepreneur’s wealth invested in the firm is positively 
correlated with perceived commitment (Busenitz et al. 2005). As the ability of an entrepreneur increases, 
its utility of an investment deal will increase by reducing the adverse selection problem through signaling. 
In contrast, less able entrepreneurs will not increase the utility of an investment deal. Signaling abilities is 
however contingent upon a sufficiently low cost of signaling, which can be high for technology-based 
ventures, in which a proof of concept or a first sale can be expensive milestones (Amit et al. 1990).  
 
When information about a quality is too costly to obtain, Podolny (2010) claims that a possible exchange 
partner, such as an investor, will rely on the status of a company to make inferences about its quality. New 
ventures rarely have much of a track record to demonstrate, however, a company’s status can also be 
derived from the status of exchange partners (Podolny 1994). For example, a prominent organization can 
expect a loss of status if it is associated with a low quality new venture and therefore has an incentive to 
avoid such exchange partners. Furthermore, if there is a perceived correlation between prominence and 
evaluative abilities, which is likely to hold for equity investors, an affiliation to an exchange partner is in 
itself an endorsement to the new venture. These effects are larger when the uncertainty of the 
circumstances increase, in which affiliations have the capacity to substitute for track-record and 
experience (Stuart et al. 1999). Thus, entrepreneurs and new ventures, through their own achievements or 
via the status of exchange partners, can signal quality, thereby reducing agency problems that impede their 
resource acquisition. 
Supply-side/Demand-side intervention framework 
Despite the ‘tools’ that investors and entrepreneurs have to overcome the problems of information 
asymmetries and uncertainty, a financial gap may still exist, and governmental intervention may be 
justified. Supply-side intervention can be useful when the pool of private capital available for investment 
is insufficient, or when there is a need to stimulate investors to make investment that they would not make 
on their own.   
 
However, fostering more high growth firms entirely through supply-side initiatives will come at an 
unfortunate cost. Without enough potential high growth firms, the increased pool of capital is likely to be 
allocated to lower quality ‘lemon’ firms, especially in the case of governmental funds in which investors 
are under pressure to “get the money out the door” (Mason & Kwok 2010). Furthermore, increasing the 
supply of investment without a corresponding increase in good firms result in greater competition between 
investors and diminished returns caused by bad investments, eventually leading the investors out of the 
market (Armour & Cumming 2006). Therefore, there needs to be a demand for financing from potential 
high growth firms, which would be the role of demand-side programs. Whereas private investors limited 
amount of capital is a supply-side constraint that is completely outside the control of the firm, demand-
side constraints are consider as factors internal to the firm (Cressy & Olofsson 1997). 
 
Figure 1 conceptualizes the financial gap and how it can be closed by either demand-side or supply-side 
intervention. In the very early stages of a new technology based firm, actors outside the firm, or even the 
entrepreneurs themselves, are unable to tell whether the venture will turn into a good, high-growth firm, or 
if it is a ‘lemon’. In this context, we define a lemon as a firm that does not have the potential to become a 
high growth firm, caused by a lack of unique product or shortage of an attractive market, or a combination 
of the two. The vast uncertainty and risk associated with NTBFs in the very early stage make it plausible 
to characterize it as a ‘question mark’. As the firm develops, the uncertainty is reduced and the firm 
becomes a more promising question mark, or one may determine the company to be a lemon.  If the 
uncertainty is reduced to a certain level, illustrated in Figure 1 as the ‘financing benchmark’, the firm has 
become investor ready and private investors are willing to provide financing. The vertical position of the 
financing benchmark is influenced by various supply-side initiatives, such as tax incentives and hybrid-
structured funds, which induce investors to tolerate more risks and uncertainty.!!
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Demand-side programs give support to firms, both financially and non-financially, thereby reducing the 
uncertainty in the venture, which in turn “pushes” them towards the financing benchmark of investors and 
also makes it easier to distinguish between good firms and ‘lemons’. Thus, the financing gap can 
theoretically be closed both through supply-side and demand-side intervention. However, as with fostering 
high growth companies entirely through supply-side intervention, only focusing on producing more 
startups is unlikely to create considerable economic impact. The private equity market must therefore have 
enough financial and managerial strength to actually grow the potential high quality firms into high value 
assets (Nightingale et al. 2009).  
 
Figure 1: Relation between demand- and supply-side. Illustrating the 'financial gap'. 
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Demand-side schemes 
Many governments have acknowledged that the main issue for young companies is to gain access to 
investors capital, not the availability or amount of capital itself (Lundström & Stevenson 2005). Prominent 
researchers have in recent years pointed towards how policy makers should specifically target high growth 
firms (Shane 2009; Lerner 2010; Mason & Brown 2013), implicitly drawing attention to demand-side 
programs as actors at the supply side per definition are concerned about growth potential. Designing 
demand-side programs is not a trivial task – something many efforts fail to succeed at (Lerner 2010; 
Lundström & Stevenson 2005). Before creating new demand-side programs, it is important to learn from 
programs that other governments have created (Mason & Harrison 2001). Although demand-side 
programs have become a more important policy focus in recent years, the majority of academic research 
on policy intervention in the process of financing of new technology-based ventures have emphasized 
supply-side programs (Rasmussen & Sørheim 2012b). 
Grants 
Demand side initiatives typically include early-stage grants to reduce initial technological uncertainty, 
such as developing a proof-of-concept, conducting market research or undergoing organizational 
development. Some schemes are targeted specifically towards university-based spinoffs, while others are 
of a more general nature. Funding mechanisms for the earliest stages of a company’s development are 
usually 100% grant based, while funding schemes for later stages often involves some form of private co-
funding (Rasmussen & Sørheim 2012a). 
Investor readiness programs 
In recent years so-called ‘investment readiness programs’ have started to emerge, often consisting of 
information seminars, workshops and networking events offered to entrepreneurs. The central objective of 
these programs is to raise the quality of investment opportunities through addressing issues such as equity 
aversion, investability and presentational failures. However, what is being delivered in these programs is 
rarely sufficient to get firms investment ready. This is because investment readiness is fundamentally 
about business development issues and requires company-specific input to identify and address barriers to 
investment (Mason & Kwok 2010). 
Business incubators 
Another demand-side scheme that attempts to increase actual firm quality is the ‘incubator’. Policy makers 
have widely recognized incubators as a tool for economic growth and facilitating the emergence of new 
technology-based firms (Bergek & Norrman 2008). However, incubators differ significantly in both 
concept and objective (Aernoudt 2004; Bøllingtoft & Ulhøi 2005), thus the focus of our study is on those 
that target “weak-but-promising” firms and aim at increasing actual firm quality through ‘value-adding 
intervention’, sometimes referred to as ‘business incubators’ (Hackett & Dilts 2004a).  
 
Together with the increase of high-tech and knowledge-based companies after the explosion of the 
internet, a new model of incubation emerged, in which access to knowledge and intangible assets have 
become increasingly important (Grimaldi & Grandi 2005). This type is typically a private, for-profit, seed 
capital incubator, meaning they support their tenants with financial and non-financial support in exchange 
for equity that they aim to capitalize on (Bøllingtoft & Ulhøi 2005). They can be set up and financially 
backed by both large corporations or by single individuals that invest their own money in the portfolio 
companies. These incubators are sometimes called ‘accelerators’, as they have the ability – and perhaps 
also an objective – to speed up the time to market through injections of capital and know-how (Grimaldi 
& Grandi 2005). 
 
Bergek & Norrman (2008) have defined a framework of dimensions that distinguish different incubator 
models, regardless of being for-profit or non-profit. Dimensions include business support, meaning 
mentoring and consulting, mediation, referring to how incubators connect firms to the outside world (or to 
each other) and selection, meaning the entry criteria and selection process.  
 
The content of the business support can be divided in administrative business matters, such as accounting 
and legal matters, and coaching or mentoring on business development. Instead of providing access to 
sources of technological or managerial expertise outside the incubator, private incubators often have such 
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knowledge in-house (Grimaldi & Grandi 2005).  Another dimension of business support is how the 
support is provided: it can be provided as (1) episodic, entrepreneur-initiated counseling, (2) episodic, 
incubator-initiated counseling or in (3) a continuous, proactive manner (Rice 2002). An important 
distinction has to be made between whether the incubator (management) sees itself as the manager of the 
incubation process itself, or as a facilitator of a process that is primarily managed by the portfolio 
companies (Bergek & Norrman 2008). Private incubators are typically characterized by strong 
involvement in their portfolio companies, even from the early concept-definition phase. 
 
Private incubators also tend to have a particular focus on creating strategic partnerships, with whom they 
mediate their portfolio companies with (Grimaldi & Grandi 2005). Incubators also typically provide 
network to potential customers, employees or other potential funding sources (Bøllingtoft & Ulhøi 2005). 
 
Regarding the selection process, private incubators may apply a «picking the winners» strategy, in which 
the incubators aim to select a few promising companies post incubation, as opposed to a «survival of the 
fittest» approach, in which incubators accept quite many companies, and rely on markets to distinguish the 
winners from the losers. Incubators with strong selection typically have screening procedures that 
resemble those of venture capitalists (Bergek & Norrman 2008).  
Venture capital and investor readiness 
Traditional venture capitalists conduct a rigorous screening process with several stages that the companies 
must go through, including comprehensive due diligence (Fried & Hisrich 1994). Furthermore, they apply 
a risk/reward assessment of potential ideas, in which the market attractiveness and product differentiation 
are proxies for expected return, while managerial capabilities and environmental threats are factors that 
represent perceived risk (Tyebjee & Bruno 1984). 
  
Douglas & Shepherd (2002) use the term “investor readiness” to explain venture capitalists assessment of 
investment opportunities. It is defined as the ability to attract significant external investor funding from 
Business Angels and/or venture capital funds. Investor readiness is decomposed to market readiness, 
technology readiness and management readiness.   
 
• Technology readiness refers to whether the technology actually works, if a prototype has been 
built and successfully tested, if the new product or service can be mass-produced at a cost that 
enables a significant profit, and if the venture has sufficient intellectual property.  
• Market readiness refers to whether the concept has been tested towards the customers and a 
demand for the product or service is proven. Ideally, initial sales signal market readiness, but 
significant market research can also reduce the market risk.  
• Management readiness refers to whether the management team has relevant experience, which 
often includes experience from management, start-ups, and related industries and technologies.  
 
The above is by Mason & Harrison (2001) considered as the “investability” of the venture and argues that 
this is the most important aspect of becoming investor ready. However, they also address two other 
aspects. The first is the owner’s attitude towards external equity financing; giving away equity implies less 
ownership and control of the company. Information asymmetries increase the cost of capital, leading the 
owners of a firm to give away more equity. The second aspect is the presentational skills of the 
entrepreneurs when presenting the business case to the investors through business plans or oral 
presentations at investor forums (Mason & Harrison 2001). 
 
To be perceived as an attractive investment opportunity for venture capitalists, the venture must be “ready” 
along all dimensions of technology, market and management (Douglas & Shepherd 2002). Indeed, many 
of the most promising investment opportunities are rejected because of a single fundamental “flaw” 
(Mason et al. 1996), meaning ‘almost ready’ is still not sufficient. Investors can require that obvious flaws 
are “corrected” before an investment is made, such as the appointment of a new CEO to correct 
management deficiencies (Douglas & Shepherd 2002). 
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Research questions 
It is argued that much of the incubator research fails to move beyond “long lists of critical success factors” 
and that research must turn attention from ‘what’ to ‘how’ and ‘why’, and ‘in what context’ these factors 
are interrelated. Furthermore, while the physical incubator facilities are well covered in research, more 
attention is needed on the incubation process and the incubatees involved (Hackett & Dilts 2004b). As 
some governments use incubators as a tool for demand-side intervention to promote high growth firms, 
there is a need to understand how these well documented activities target the market failure leading to 
financial constraints for these firms. Indeed, Lundström & Stevenson (2005) argue that demand-side 
programs should apply a bottom-up approach, addressing the underlying deficiencies leading to a market 
failure by isolating the problems experienced by the firms and design schemes that target these specific 
problems. Theoretically, uncertainty related to companies and information asymmetries between 
companies and investors are hampering the investment process, making it irrational for private investors to 
invest in the early stages. Thus, incubators, used by governments for demand-side intervention, should 
address information asymmetries and uncertainty in order to improve the financing problems for the firms 
it supports. 
 
Identifying which companies to support at an early stage, the stage in which governments usually 
intervene, is recognized as a highly challenging task – something that even experienced investors fail at 
(Shane 2009; Mason & Brown 2013). Incubators need to be able to select the firms that are promising, but 
weak due to a lack of resources, and distinguish them from the ones that do not need or cannot be helped 
through support programs (Hackett & Dilts 2004b). These incubators are therefore in the same position as 
other private investors, as high uncertainty and information asymmetries make it difficult to distinguish 
these firms from other ‘lemon’ firms. Therefore, it is appropriate to ask: 
 
Q1 ‘Picking’ winners: How can incubators, as demand-side initiatives, «pick winners» at such early 
stages of the firm’s life cycle? 
 
Incubators with the aim of creating high growth firms will need to develop them to become ‘investor 
ready’. This implies reducing the uncertainty of their portfolio companies to a level in which investors 
perceive them as having a sufficient level of market readiness, management readiness and technology 
readiness. Incubator activities are quite well documented, but how these are associated with reducing 
company uncertainty is not. Hence the following research question: 
 
Q2 ‘Making’ winners:  How can incubators, as demand-side initiatives, reduce uncertainty related to 
new ventures, so that they become investor ready? 
 
In addition to reducing its inherent uncertainty to a level that private investors can accept, a company must 
also be perceived as an attractive investment opportunity in the eyes of investors. A company can signal 
quality through its own achievements or through affiliations with other organizations, such as an incubator. 
At the same time, an incubator will have more information about the quality of its portfolio companies 
than other investors, making the lemons problem applicable for the incubator-investor relationship. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to ask:  
 
Q3 ‘Selling’ winners:  How can incubators, as demand-side initiatives, reduce information asymmetries 
between new ventures and investors, thus increasing the investors perceived 
quality of the firm? 
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Methodology 
Theory-building case study research design  
The objective of our research is both to try to explain the causal links between how activities in incubator 
demand-side programs manage to reduce uncertainty and information asymmetries, but also to explore 
how they manage to select the promising firms.  Due to the both explanatory and exploratory nature of the 
research questions, a qualitative approach was chosen for the study (Yin 2009). Little research has been 
conducted on demand-side initiatives (Rasmussen & Sørheim 2012b), which makes a qualitative approach 
capable to make a significant contribution to theory development (Eisenhardt 1989b). In this research, a 
multiple case study of two demand-side programs was chosen. A multilevel approach was applied to each 
case, which included several interview subjects that covered different roles and relations to the programs.  
 
The first research question (Q1) was approached with an exploratory strategy: since incubators select 
companies at a much different stage than venture capitalists, the authors looked for dimensions in 
investment-decisions that differed from traditional theory on venture capital decision making (Tyebjee & 
Bruno 1984; Douglas & Shepherd 2002). For the other two research questions (Q2) and (Q3), the authors 
relied on existing theory on market deficiencies and incubator activities to specify variables, without 
considering the relations between them (Eisenhardt 1989b).  
Theory development 
Developing a conceptual model of how governments can bridge the financial gap required the authors to 
get a grasp on a broad range of existing theory, both to identify research questions and to compare with 
emerging concepts from the study (Yin 2009; Eisenhardt 1989b). The authors started out by examining 
grand theory (Bryman 2008) to understand the concepts of market failure (information asymmetries and 
uncertainty) in new venture financing. Based on this understanding, the authors developed an initial 
conceptual model of the capital gap, illustrating how it may be bridged in different ways. The focus was 
thereafter narrowed down to demand-side programs, where middle-range theory (Bryman 2008) on 
various governmental demand side intervention mechanisms was examined. Finally, research questions 
were created to explain and explore the connections between demand-side programs and the market 
deficiencies that essentially provide the purpose for the programs existence.  
Case Selection 
Given the limited number of cases available, two cases that claim to have promising results were chosen. 
The governments in Israel and Finland have created programs targeting potentially good firms that are 
unable to get financing from private investors (Wylie 2011; Autio et al. 2013), and both programs engage 
private, for-profit incubators, to target potential high-growth firms. As advised by (Eisenhardt 1989b), the 
case selection is not random, but driven by theory. 
Multi-level Data Collection1 
The program as a whole is considered as the unit of analysis. However, the study is an embedded case 
(Yin 2009), in which data is extracted from various sources and interviews are conducted with people with 
different roles in or relations to the program: we used a multilevel approach, interviewing government 
officials, incubator/accelerator managers and CEOs of participating companies, thereby being able to 
reveal inconsistencies between purpose and reality. Thus, the risk of interview bias affecting the results is 
reduced (Yin 2009), which would have been more likely if for example only program management had 
been interviewed. Many previous studies of demand- and/or supply-side intervention tend to collect data 
solely from program managers, thus creating a risk to miss out on important nuances, therefore not being 
able to perceive and describe the ‘authentic picture’. Consequently, it was important to take a multi-level 
approach in this study. 
                                                      
1 In total these interviews lasted 13 hours and 10 minutes and all interviews except one were tape recorded and transcribed. The transcriptions 
totaled 186 single spaced pages and just above 86,000 words. 
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Interviews 
Three interview guides were created, one for the program management, one for incubator management, 
and one for company CEOs. The interview guides were based on the authors’ knowledge from literature 
reviews as well as available documentation (reports, evaluations and presentations). 
 
Case 1. The Israeli Technological Incubator Program 
 Interviewee Industry Time in program 
Program Management Program Manager Governmental 4 years 
Incubator Management 1 CEO+VP Lifescience 7 Years 
Incubator Management 2 CEO Medical 7 Years 
Incubator Management 3 COO Cleanweb 3 Months 
Company 1 CEO Lifescience 1.5 Years 
Company 2 CEO Lifescience 1.5 Years 
Company 3 CEO Lifescience 3 Years 
Company 4 CEO Medical 1.5 Years 
Company 5 CEO Medical 1.5 Years 
Company 6 CEO Medical 1 Year 
Company 7 CEO Cleanweb 3 Months 
 
 
Case 2. The Finnish Vigo Accelerator Program 
 Interviewee Industry Time in program 
Program Management Profict Private 3 Years 
Program Management TEM Governmental 4 Years 
Program Management TEKES Governmental 4 Years 
Program Management Finnvera Governmental 4 Years 
Incubator Management 1 CEO Software 2 Years 
Incubator Management 2 CEO Software 4 Years 
Company 1 CEO Software Exit 
Company 2 CEO Software 1.5 Years 
Company 3 CEO Software 0.5 Years 
Company 4 CEO Software 2 Years 
  
Data analysis 
The authors employed an iterative process to determine the final categories in which the data was 
analyzed after. First, the authors ‘played’ with the data, by organizing quotes in a spreadsheet based on 
both theoretical solutions to uncertainty and information problems, and activities performed in incubators. 
The data was thereby reorganized into categories that were closely related to the research questions. 
Working with the data in this manner helped the authors to become intimately familiar with the data and 
to be able to make useful causal connections (Eisenhardt 1989b; Yin 2009). After arriving at an initial set 
of categories for data coding, it was compared with theory and then revised. The final categories for data 
coding are provided below. 
 
Data coding 
Q1: Picking winners Q2: Making winners Q3: Selling winners 
• Investment criteria 
• Timing and fit 
• Approach to support 
• Reducing technology 
uncertainty 
• Reducing market 
uncertainty 
• Reducing management 
uncertainty 
• Focus 
• Establishing 
information flow 
• Improving information 
flow 
• Transferring 
information about 
quality 
 
 
14 
 
Each case was independently analyzed as described above, before performing a cross-case analysis 
(Eisenhardt 1989b; Yin 2009), searching for patterns based on the findings in the individual analysis. 
Findings from each of the cases were put in tables to highlight similarities and differences, from which 
theoretical considerations were derived.  
Transferability considerations 
To be able to increase the transferability of the results, the authors strived to apply replication logic to the 
investigation of the two cases (Yin 2009). Thus, due to logistic issues, it was not possible to have 
interview subjects with the same set of roles in the two programs. However, all roles were filled in both 
investigations, but the amount of subjects at each level differed (program management, incubator 
management and company CEOs).  
 
The context in which the programs are implemented is also not completely replicated between the 
programs. Indeed, contextual aspects can make it inappropriate to transfer ‘good practice’ policy measures 
from one country to another (Lundström & Stevenson 2005). However, it can be argued that similar 
observations in programs that are implemented in different environments makes the context, as a rival 
explanation (Yin 2009), less accountable for the observed results. Therefore, the authors argue that the 
provided results can be universal for a wider range of contexts than those of the two cases in this study. 
Still, even though in-depth contextual investigations are not performed in study, some considerations of 
contextual similarities and differences are provided for policy makers to make their own assessments on 
whether findings in this study can be replicated elsewhere.  
 
 
15 
Data Analysis 
Case 1 – The Israeli Technological Incubators Program (TIP) 
Case description 
Rational and purpose 
The Israeli Technological Incubator Program (TIP) is a governmental response to a ‘market failure’.  The 
program was introduced by the Office of the Chief Scientist in the Ministry of Industry and Trade in 1991, 
as an effort to employ high-educated Soviet immigrants and hundreds of laid-off engineers from the Israeli 
military industry. Prior to the incubator program, policies had emphasized R&D and it was clear that the 
government needed to enhance start-up formation and growth. Governmental efforts to promote 
entrepreneurial high-tech activity was initiated through the incubator program alongside policies 
developing the VC-industry (Yozma program) (Avnimelech et al. 2007).  The incubators were originally 
run by municipalities and academic institutions, but the program management realized that such 
shareholders lacked the commercially orientation to provide sufficient value to the portfolio companies. 
Between 2002 and 2010, all incubators were privatized, and are now owned by private actors such as 
private investors, high-tech companies or multinational corporations (Interview Program Manager 2014). 
 
The program has evolved since its origin as the characteristics of the market failure have changed. The 
present market failure is that Israeli early-stage, high-risk, innovative, technological enterprises fail to 
raise money from the private sector. The main objective of the program is to create new startups that 
would not have been started otherwise. The idea is to provide funding and support activities through 
specialized incubators to these high-risk firms. Through this, the firms are developed over a 2-year period 
with the ultimate goal being to lead them towards private equity investments at the end of the period.  
Governmental subsidizing 
The privately owned incubators invest in their portfolio companies from their own pockets when 
admitting a company to their incubator, and receive 30-50% equity in return. The revenue model of the 
incubators is based on divesting their equity at a higher value through an exit. Every company has a 
budget for the incubation period: the government will grant 85% of the budget, whereas the incubator’s 
investment represents the remaining 15%. The budget for most projects is 0.5 million USD, while budgets 
of up to 0.7 million USD can be approved for projects in industries that are characterized by higher risk 
and more costly development, such as clean-tech or life sciences. The grant is given directly to the 
companies, but must be paid back after the company has started to generate revenues, through royalties of 
3% per year until the full amount is paid back (Interview Program Manager 2014).  
 
The program has an annual budget of 50 million USD, which is distributed to companies in 20 different 
incubators. From 1991 to 2012, the Israeli government spent 690 million USD on the Technology 
Incubators Program. The portfolio companies of the program have during the same period attracted 3.5 
billion USD from private investors. Thus, each governmental dollar spent has triggered five private dollars 
in portfolio company investments (Interview Program Manager 2014). 
Incubator activities  
All incubators provide a similar set of services. The incubators provide office space and infrastructure for 
R&D such as labs that the companies can use when developing their product (Smoler 2010). The size of 
the incubator staff usually counts between 8-10 people, providing both administrative services such as 
accounting and legal services, but also business mentoring and technical assistance. The management of 
the incubators normally has industry experience, such as from starting companies, raising money or 
working as private equity investors. Both the shareholders and management of the incubators provide a 
network of potential customers, partners and investors to the portfolio companies (Interview Program 
Manager 2014).  The incubators can charge a monthly sum for overhead costs, for which the OCS has set 
an upper limit. However, according to an incubator manager, this does not fully cover their monthly 
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expenses. Thus, increasing the value of the portfolio companies is the only way the incubator can profit 
from their activities (Interview Incubator CEO 2014b). 
Tender 
To receive a license to run an incubator in the Technological Incubators Program, the shareholders need to 
participate in a competitive tender process controlled by the Office of the Chief Scientist. If approved, the 
shareholders receive a license to run an incubator for eight years, in which they can compete in a new 
tender process for a new license in their seventh year. The licensee model was recently changed from 
three years licenses to eight years licenses, as a three-year period was too short to evaluate the 
performance of a high-risk incubator (Interview Program Manager 2014).  As of today, the main criteria 
that are evaluated are the proposed managements’ ability to add value to the portfolio companies, financial 
strength to make post-incubation follow-on investments, and an ability to support companies to penetrate 
outside markets. Some multinational corporations have therefore received licenses to run an incubator, and 
The Office of Chief Scientist is welcoming more to compete. In 2014, large corporations such as GE, 
Phillips and Microsoft were planning to participate in the tender process (Weinreb & Shelach 2014).  
Screening of portfolio  companies 
The technological incubators program has a thorough and competitive screening process, in which only 
5% of those who approach the incubators are approved for incubation. The selection process involves both 
the incubator and the Office of the Chief Scientist, however incubators conduct the majority of the 
screening. The incubators make recommendations of which companies they would like to approve, and 
the Office of the Chief Scientist controls that the recommendations are aligned with the purpose of the 
program. 
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Case 1. ‘Picking winners' 
Approximately 200-250 projects are screened per year at each incubator. The screening process, as 
described by one of the incubators, starts by a short assessment of the technology, market and whether the 
incubator can add value to the company. This is followed by a brainstorming session with the incubator 
team to outline a likely development process of the company. The next step is a more thorough due 
diligence, in which the team puts down efforts to understand the technology, the need for the product, 
market issues and financials, as well as obtaining opinions from experts in the respective field. Then the 
gaps and risks that should be addressed through the incubation are identified. This is translated into a two-
year work plan and presented to the investor committee, which consists of the founders and management 
team of the incubator (Interview Incubator VP 2014).  The recommendations of the incubator investment 
committee are sent to the Office of the Chief Scientist, which nominates an expert from a pool of experts 
to perform due diligence and write a report to the program manger of the incubator program. Then the 
incubator presents the projects in front of the “technological incubator committee”, which includes 
representatives from the government, investors and industry experts from a variety of fields. This 
committee takes the final decision on whether to accept or reject the project (Interview Program Manager 
2014). 
Investment 
criteria 
The incubator managements are looking for investment opportunities that represent a significant 
potential return: the market must be large and business ideas should have the potential to disrupt 
existing solutions. 
 
«We are looking for game changers; and we’re willing to take a risk.» (Incubator VP) 
 
The incubator managers indicated that they require a (theoretical) proof of concept for the technology. 
The incubators use personnel with technological experience to verify that the technology ‘makes sense’.  
 
«We wouldn’t invest in a company that would come to us without a proof of concept, but then again – a proof of concept 
can be theoretical proof of concept.» (Incubator COO) 
 
«The screening process usually starts by our CTOs just because he’s seen so many technologies, just to understand whether 
the technology makes sense, because we invest in technologies». (Incubator CEO) 
 
Companies with even less developed technology may be accepted if the team appears to be experienced.   
 
«We know the market of orthopedic surgery very well. We know the market gaps, because we’ve done this for 20 years. We 
came here with just an idea of a solution to one of the gaps.» (Company CEO)  
 
In general, the management team is considered an important element when selecting companies, but not 
a prerequisite. The incubators can recruit new management to supplement or replace the existing team.  
 
«We have had one or two cases where we said that we can take the project, but you’re not a good fit to be the CEO.» 
(Incubator CEO) 
 
«We want the cardiologist to be a cardiologist. We will recruit someone new to run the project, it’s pretty easy to do so as 
well.» (Incubator CEO) 
 
Timing 
and fit 
The incubator management needs to see if the company has the potential to raise money post-incubation. 
They ‘plan backwards’ to see if this goal is reachable during incubation. This ‘timing factor’ seems to be 
more important than the actual company life cycle stage.   
 
«After 18 months they should be at the point where they can really pitch their startups to investors for an A-round.» 
(Incubator CEO) 
 
«Sometimes, you could have a very early stage technology, but with the right scientific basis to reach that fundable 
milestone within 18 months, the project could be eligible for incubation. For other projects you could be beyond proof of 
concepts but the path to your milestone is so long... you could not incubate such a company in this kind of structure because 
it requires too much.» (Incubator VP).  
 
«We sometimes tell them that there are three big unknowns, three big questions… So go back to the lab, try to get some 
governmental funding maybe, to answer one of those questions. Maybe we can provide some funding to help answer 
another of those questions, even in a pre-clinical model before incubation, and then we know what one big question we 
have for incubation. And that’s acceptable.» (Incubator VP) 
 
The incubators emphasize that they need to have the right competencies to increase the value of the 
company. 
 
«We decide whether we have an added value for the project or not.» (Incubator VP) 
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Case 1. ‘Making winners’ through reducing uncertainty  
The incubator management provided hands-on support and indicated that they spend a lot of time 
supporting the companies. The support appears to be of a consulting nature, in which the entrepreneurs 
approach the incubator management for advice, but there are also regular meetings with the incubator staff. 
 
«We really do provide hands-on managerial support. Even the CEO himself will walk down this corridor and visit the 
project leaders on a daily basis, talking about their concerns and milestones.» (Incubator VP) 
«We have meetings, but we also interact with the companies via telephone and in the corridor, and we try to build the 
interaction to mostly consist of informal meetings.» (Incubator CEO) 
Reducing 
technology 
uncertainty 
The incubator management had technical competence in-house, which provided technical guidance to 
the companies on a daily basis. (At least) two of the incubators also had in-house labs for R&D. 
 
«We have a CTO that works with the companies to see that we’re on track and that they make reasonable technical 
decisions.» (Incubator CEO) 
 
«The CTO here can build everything in terms of technology, so when they need help to build something he is here for that. 
They can consult with him on daily basis.» (Incubator CEO) 
 
Reducing 
market 
uncertainty 
The incubators provide know-how on how their portfolio companies should approach and interact with 
market stakeholders, as well as market specific information. They utilize their network to connect 
companies with information providers or possible strategic partners. 
 
«They can get all the insight they need about establishing strategic partnerships, doing contracts, revising the business 
model, how to approach potential clients, partners, etc.» (Incubator COO) 
 
«We provide our experience, our insight, our connections… So if he needs to be connected to someone overseas, to 
establish partnerships […] He gets all our connections, that’s our aim.» (Incubator COO) 
 
«We could support with industry specific services related to such as regulation, Q&A… So we have people that specialize 
in this area.» (Incubator CEO) 
 
Reducing 
management 
uncertainty 
In many cases, there was a strong presence of experienced management teams in the portfolio 
companies. 
 
«It’s not people who we think we will need to extensively ‘train’. You need to have the potential already when you start.» 
(Incubator CEO) 
 
The incubators were somewhat strengthening the management of the portfolio through coaching 
activities. 
 
«I came with management skills, so I think I know what I should do.  Of course I always listen to advice from the 
incubator management. However, every-day decisions are made internally, while I may ask for advice when facing more 
complicated issues.» (Company CEO) 
 
However, adding and/or replacing members seem to be a more significant contribution to the quality of 
the management team. 
 
«We want the cardiologist to be a cardiologist. We will recruit someone new to run the project, it’s pretty easy to do so as 
well.» (Incubator CEO) 
 
Focus 
Through providing a wide range of professional ‘administrative’ services, the companies are able to 
focus on developing their businesses. 
 
«We provide an ‘umbrella’ of professional services. Book keeping, legal, and so forth. To really have our project leaders 
focus on their tasks whether it’d be in the beginning of product development or the beginning of business development.» 
(Incubator CEO) 
 
«I have the opportunity to focus on the technology, on the work itself, on the engineering and moving forward, and less 
with bureaucratic things.» (Company CEO) 
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Not all portfolio companies reported that they used the available support as extensively as they could. 
Companies in different incubators indicated that they had the necessary experience to develop and grow 
companies, more so than they believed other companies had. As described by one of the portfolio 
companies: «We don’t need the coaching they provide some of the teams, because we’ve been launching 
projects every year for 20 years. So we know our way». Other, less experienced teams, reported that they 
first and foremost perceived the incubator as an investor in their company, secondly as a mean for non-
financial support. 
Case 1. ‘Selling winners’ by reducing information asymmetries 
The incubators had a somewhat different approach to how they supported the firms in the fundraising 
process towards the end of the incubation period. Two of the incubators provided follow-on financing to 
promising portfolio companies post-incubation, either from a traditional venture-fund or from a parent 
company. However, they preferred to syndicate with other private investors, in which they took the role as 
lead investor. The last incubator in the case study did not provide follow-on financing, and put more 
emphasis on their role in fundraising process of their portfolio companies.  
 
Establishing 
information 
flow 
The incubator connects their portfolio companies with investors. Investors approach 
incubators to identify new opportunities and the incubator management proactively approach 
investors on behalf of their portfolio companies. 
 
«Often, investors approach us to get company introductions […] and we’re also very proactive, we go to 
investors, I talk to them, I talk with every VC in Israel.» (Incubator CEO) 
 
«One of our current investors was introduced by the guys from this incubator.» (Company CEO) 
 
«We had a road show in the United States that brought me some of the investors. I got very significant 
assistance.» (Company CEO) 
 
«They are very, very helpful to engage you with potential investors.» (Company CEO) 
 
Improving 
information 
flow 
The incubator staff was involved in preparing investor presentations.  
 
«We are helping the companies with building their investor presentations.» (Incubator CEO) 
 
«They helped me by arranging the Power Point presentation.» (Company CEO) 
 
Transferring 
information  
about quality 
The reputation of one of the incubators was emphasized by both the incubator management 
and company CEOs. 
 
«I think in terms of the medical devices we’re one of the prominent investors in early stage in Israel… in 
medical devices we are pretty good name internationally.» (Incubator CEO) 
 
«The reputation that [the incubator] has in Israel is very, very high.» (Company CEO) 
 
Incubators appear to be a trusted source of information about investment opportunities to 
investors.  
 
«The investors trust us. They know that if we say it’s a good company, it’s a good company.» (Incubator CEO)  
 
The same incubator manager could easily connect its companies to VCs.  
 
«I can get a meeting for any company to any VC in Israel.» (Incubator CEO) 
 
There were indications that incubator support and ‘robustness’ could increase the investors’ 
confidence of the project’s viability. 
 
«It shows the investor that it is part of a bigger organization. Even from a very simple perspective of having a 
CFO so people know that the money is managed in a proper way. It gives the company an added value that 
would be very hard for the company to achieve on its own.» (Incubator CEO) 
 
!
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Case 2 – The Finnish VIGO Accelerator Program 
Case description 
Rational 
Traditionally, Finland is internationally renowned for being one of the most successful innovation 
economics with one of the highest R&D-investments per capita in the world. Despite this, a joint 
evaluation by the public sector and venture capital industry in 2007 revealed that the country was 
producing very few international high growth firms. Public sector funding, including the existing 
incubator system, were wasting too much resources to “lifestyle” companies (i.e. firms without growth 
ambitions), thus creating a large number of companies with inadequate resources for growth. Existing 
incubators were a component in real estate management, in which real estate companies were subsidized 
to build facilities with incubators, and were therefore incentivized to increase the number of tenants 
(Ruohonen & Oy 2007; Interview TEM 2014). For a long time, the majority of governmental funding was 
supporting the venture capital market, however it became clear that the main issue for the venture 
capitalists was the quality of the startups, not the amount of available capital (Interview TEM 2014). The 
competence base in the high-growth ecosystem was also insufficient due to a lack of serial entrepreneurs 
and managers with international business experience that were willing to engage in startup activities 
(Ruohonen & Oy 2007). Instead of modifying existing programs, the VIGO accelerator program was 
launched in 2009 to target these perceived gaps (Autio et al. 2013). 
Government intervention 
The VIGO program is set to last for a six-year period, through which the government is facilitating the 
creation of business accelerators. The accelerators are private companies consisting of 3-5 people with 
experience as serial entrepreneurs, VC-investors or large-firm managers with international experience. 
They raise and invest their own funds (as well as the ones of other private investors) for an equity stake in 
very early stage companies. Thus, their main revenue model is based on the growth of company valuations 
towards an exit.  
 
The government launched a number of mechanisms to facilitate the emergence of the accelerators: 
• A private company was hired by the government to coordinate the program, which put together 
principles and guides for the accelerators and do PR activities to create brand-awareness around 
the VIGO program (Interview Program Coordinator 2014). 
• VIGO portfolio companies receive preferred treatment and brand acceptance by Tekes and 
Finnvera, which are public institutions providing grants and equity investments, loans and 
guarantees respectively (Autio et al. 2013).  Within Tekes, each accelerator has a ‘key account 
manager’ that provides hands-on advice on how to secure governmental funding and who strive to 
provide a faster application process than for non-VIGO applicants (Interview TEKES 2014). 
• Management fees as compensation for services provided by the accelerator management are 
eligible costs for the Tekes grants. An agreement between the accelerator and portfolio company 
is required, in which the maximum management fee is 9000 EUR per company per month. 
However, this incentive mechanism is disputed as it entails certain agency problems (Autio et al. 
2013). As of today, approximately half of the accelerators do not collect any fees, while those who 
do collect significantly less than the upper limit (Interview Program Coordinator 2014). 
Activities  
The accelerator itself must invest a minimum of 30,000 EUR in a portfolio company, besides that, there 
are few, if any, restrictions from the government or the program coordinator on how the accelerator should 
operate or in what kind of companies they should invest in. In fact, there is no formal contract between the 
government or project coordinator and the accelerators. Having the VIGO brand represent a certain ‘way 
of doing things’, and may be withdrawn if operations differ adversely from the intention of the program 
coordinator (Interview Program Coordinator 2014).  
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The accelerator teams typically consist of 2-4 partners. In terms of the degree of ‘hands-on’ support, there 
is clear variation in how the accelerators support their portfolio firms. Some accelerators diverge towards 
effectively being a venture capital fund, raising money from external parties and investing in very early 
stage companies. Others are more involved, providing managerial services such as fundraising and 
networking, whereas some are heavily involved on the operational side, even taking a management role in 
the portfolio companies (Autio et al. 2013). There is however no indication that accelerators converge to 
one model or another, nor is this an ambition of the program coordinator. Regardless the model of 
operation, the accelerators are supposed to make a distinct contribution in the companies over the course 
of about two years (Interview Program Coordinator 2014).  This primarily translates into developing 
startups that receive an A-round investment (>2 million EUR) from a professional investor (Interview 
TEM 2014). However, there is no clearly defined acceleration period. The project coordinator encourages 
accelerators to give intensive support for as long as needed, which can last between six months and two 
years, and take a less active role as the companies move forward (Interview Program Coordinator 2014). 
Interlinkage with public  funding sources 
No new public funds were set up in relation to the VIGO-program. It was designed to utilize existing 
funding mechanisms that already were in place (Interview Program Coordinator 2014). One year before 
VIGO was launched, Tekes established a new fund called “Funding for Young Innovative Growth 
Companies” (YIC) (Tillvaxtanalys 2011), targeting the most promising startups that are set for 
international growth. The fund grants a maximum of 1 million EUR, covering 75% of eligible costs, and is 
granted in stages based on milestones (Maijanen 2014). In addition, Tekes provides R&D support 
consisting of a mix of grants and loans.  
 
For the YIC grant, Tekes has a comprehensive screening process, in which the international growth 
potential is emphasized: (1) a proficient team or a clear plan on how this shall be acquired should be in 
place, (2) the market size should be above 100 million EUR unless it is a niche market, and (3) the 
technology or product should be somewhat ready to scale. To be able to identify the most promising firms, 
Tekes has recruited a pool of experts, typically from the venture capital industry, that provides input and 
advise on whether the companies are eligible for funding or not (Interview TEKES 2014).  
 
All though the same official entry criteria and procedures count for VIGO companies, they enjoy a ‘fast 
track’ to governmental funding through speedy handling of applications. Furthermore, every VIGO 
accelerator has a designated ‘Tekes contact advisor’, available at any time to offer hands-on advise on 
Tekes funding. It is also acknowledged that VIGO firms enjoy a ‘mark of quality’ within Tekes (Interview 
TEKES 2014). Between 2009 and 2013, a total of 60 million EUR of Tekes funding was provided to 
VIGO companies. 
 
Finnvera Venture Capital can also provide a maximum of 1 million EUR in equity investments. The 
VIGO companies must go through a separate screening process to get funds from Finnvera Venture 
Capital. However, in the future the VIGO program coordinator is seeking to package funding from Tekes 
and Finnvera through a single screening process for both institutions (Interview Program Coordinator 
2014).  
 
Even though no new governmental bodies or new public funds were created as the VIGO-program was 
initiated, it was estimated that the VIGO-program would impose an extra expenditure of 100 million EUR 
for government funds during the six years that the program is being run. Over the course of the same 
period, 100 million should be raised by private investors, which was achieved after the four first years 
(Interview Program Coordinator 2014). According to the Finnish Ministry of Employment and Economy, 
the VIGO program has led so a significant increase of international private investors and VC investments 
in Finnish startup companies (Interview TEM 2014). 
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Case 2. ‘Picking winners’ 
Approximately 200-250 projects are screened each year by each incubator (Interview Incubator CEO 
2014a). The screening process, as described by one of the incubator managers, involves the following 
steps: when being approached by a company, it is decided whether or not the company meets the 
investment focus of the incubator. Secondly, the idea is discussed in a weekly meeting with the rest of the 
team, and it is decided if further screening should be conducted. If so, the company meets the entire 
incubator team, all existing materials are scrutinized, in which the execution plan and financing needs over 
the next few years are emphasized. How negotiations and due diligence are conducted depends on the 
current stage of the company, however, external actors are rarely used in this process. A final decision is 
based on the deal terms and potential syndication partners. All though there may be a difference in 
particular screening steps, this appears to be the ‘general’ due diligence approach of most incubators.  
 
Investment 
criteria 
Incubators are implicitly considering the potential return of their investments, as they 
require business ideas with a large, global market. Disruptive ideas seem to be preferred.  
 
«We invest in companies who can become dangerous. It has to have the potential to become a global 
leader, a ‘category winner’». (Accelerator CEO)  
 
It appears as if incubators are more concerned about whom they invest in rather then 
what they invest in. Although not a definite prerequisite, a good team may supersede high 
technology and market uncertainty.  
 
«We didn’t have anything else but a slide deck, and actually [the incubator] never even saw the slide deck. 
So they saw our team and they said “okay, this is the team for this one, so we’ll take a chance with you 
guys”» (Company CEO) 
 
Incubators invest from their own balance in firms that are significantly uncertain.  
 
«Through the accelerator we invest into companies that are just ideas […] they are just projects for us, 
they are in the form of a company, but they are looking for a market, a business mode, a product-market 
fit.» (Incubator CEO) 
 
«We basically might invest in you just having an idea.» (Incubator CEO) 
 
Timing 
and fit 
The incubator needs to see that the company has an unreleased potential that can be 
utilized to increase the value of the company. This is typically recognized as a ‘flaw’ in the 
companies.  
 
«When%the companies come to us they need to have a good upside, but nearly all of them have something 
wrong… there must be something wrong in the plan, the team, the business model, or on the technological 
side, so that there is a role for the accelerator to actually grow the case.» (Incubator CEO) 
 
«When evaluating projects, we try to find what is ‘wrong’ and how to change that. That’s the core.» 
(Incubator CEO)%
 
The incubator management needs to believe that they have the capabilities to «fix the 
flaw» in the companies.  
 
«We require that there’s a ‘match’, so that we can help the companies.» (Incubator CEO) 
 
 
!
!
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Case 2. ‘Making winners’ by reducing uncertainty!
The management staff in the incubators provided hands-on support and could in the early phase of the 
acceleration period spend up to two days a week with a portfolio company. The support appears to be of a 
strategic and operational nature, in which the incubator managers work on the actual tasks of the 
companies. Support for specific issues could also be initiated by the entrepreneurs.     
«We want to be active in the company, spend one or two days a week sitting with the company and taking charge. 
Typically we are very active for a year, taking the role as head of product development, head of strategy, head of 
business development […] We have a set of goals, for instance getting the next customer, so that we can raise the next 
funding. And we work on these goals every day.» (Incubator CEO) 
Reducing 
technology 
uncertainty 
Generally technical support does not seem to be a focus in the program. However, one of 
the incubators had a technical expert who could provide support that could enhance the 
scalability, thereby preparing for internationalization.  
«We have a «CTO guy», he often changes the architecture of the company’s product to scale it.» (Incubator 
CEO) 
 
«They connect the dots and have really good inputs on the product in the early phase.» (Company CEO) 
 
Reducing 
market 
uncertainty 
Both incubators appear to mostly focus on market activities, particularly by turning 
attention to-, and working on how to, approach international markets. This was done 
through identification and co-selection of potential markets and partners.  
 
«During the incubation period we take some key role that really accelerates the sales, finishes the product 
or starts the internationalization.» (Incubator CEO) 
 
«I work mostly on internationalization, getting partners and doing international sales. This week I’m 
helping a company with selecting 10 cities in Europe to which they will expand to.» (Incubator CEO) 
 
«We started expanding to international markets much earlier than what we would have done otherwise.» 
(Company CEO) 
 
«They are now helping us with finding distribution channels and partners. We are now in a stage where our 
technology is very stable, and it is all about sales and marketing.» (Company CEO) 
 
The incubator provided significant strategic support, for example by changing the business 
model to ease the customer acquisition process.  
 
«We are good at making the damn change. For instance, we totally changed one company’s business model. 
When we came in they had an IT system, which they tried to sell to taxi companies. But taxi companies don’t 
have money and they don’t know IT. We said okay, don’t go to taxis. Let’s use the IT system ourselves and 
bring rides to the taxi companies. Instead of asking money from them, we bring money to them because 
we’re operating the IT system to consumers to pre-book their rides.» (Incubator CEO) 
 
Reducing 
management 
uncertainty 
All companies interviewed had a strong team before joining the incubator. However, the 
incubators provided valuable connections and introductions to strengthen the management 
team, with special emphasize on sales and internationalization expertise. 
 
«One of our field guys was brought in to an introduction by them, he was recommended, I met him, and he’s 
now one of our best sales guys.» (Company CEO)  
 
«They are introducing us to very, very interesting people that could be part of the management in the future. 
We are now scaling up, so we are looking for sales and marketing people.» (Company CEO) 
 
The incubator management could also strengthen the management team by taking on a 
managerial role (typically CEO/CMO) in the companies themselves, although (mostly) on a 
preliminary basis. In addition, they typically take permanent board positions in their 
portfolio companies. 
 
«We are really an extension of the team.» (Incubator CEO)  
 
«Typically we are very active the first year, taking the role of head product development, head of strategy, 
head of business development, etc. Also, we take board seats.» (Incubator CEO) 
 
Focus 
The incubator managers can take care of emerging company tasks when their portfolio 
companies are too ‘busy’. 
 
«We are their ‘extra hands’ so they call anyone of us and ask “hey can you assist me with this”, and we will 
do it if we can. We don’t bill for everything we do.» (Incubator CEO) 
 
 
 
24 
 
Case 2 ‘Selling winners’ by reducing information asymmetries 
Supporting the companies to receive financing, both from international and domestic funding sources, is 
one of the most important value-added contributions from the incubators (Autio et al. 2013). In Finland, 
the incubators have a special role to support their companies to secure governmental funding from Tekes, 
considering they have a ‘key account manager’ there. Some of the companies in this study also mentioned 
that securing this funding was one of the main reasons for joining the incubator, and generally put less 
emphasis on the operational support. However, companies also reported significant support related to 
obtaining private investments as well.  
 
 
Establishing 
information 
flow 
 
Incubator managers have extensive networks with potential investors, both in Finland 
and internationally, which they utilize to bring investors to the table. Fundraising support 
was emphasized as one of the most important value-adding support activities.   
 
«One of our guys has spent time in Silicon Valley and made investments there […] He has a huge network 
of angel investors.» (Incubator CEO) 
 
«The idea is that we have like a «virtual fund»: we have 30 – 40 business angels who are close to us and 
we typically raise 150k-300k as a seed round.» (Incubator CEO) 
 
«They main value is really the connections to the possible future investors. They really helped us with 
that.» (Company CEO) 
 
«They have really good VC connections in the United States and Europe. We ended up getting our VC 
from London.» (Company CEO) 
 
Improving 
information 
flow 
In addition to helping with building presentation decks, the incubator managers also 
joined meetings and negotiations with investors. 
 
«For example, we are now closing a round raising 200k. So I was helping the company with negotiating 
with those investors. I would join meetings and help with presentations. (Incubator CEO) 
 
«When pitching to investors, the incubator management did some of that convincing, making the business 
look more serious.» (Company CEO) 
 
Transferring 
information 
about 
quality 
One of the incubators had previously enjoyed significant success, which they believed 
provided them credibility in the eyes of investors. 
 
«The incubator has been very successful, and there’s a comment ‘if one could only put some money in all 
of the companies [Incubator] has invested in, one would make so much money’. It adds credibility.» 
(Company CEO) 
 
«In the VC round it was a very good sign in terms of robustness having the incubator on board.» 
(Company CEO) 
 
Being associated with a specific incubator made it also easier to obtain governmental 
funding, as it led the company to be put under less scrutiny than other companies:  
 
«So our process with getting the Tekes funding was ‘okay you’re part of the VIGO, you’re part of 
‘Incubator X’, and the idea kind of makes sense, let’s move forward’.» (Company CEO) 
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Cross-case analysis 
How incubators ‘pick winners’ 
Policy makers argue that governmental schemes promoting entrepreneurship cannot focus on a small 
number of high-growth firms, because we do not know which firms will become high growth businesses 
and which won’t (Shane 2009). The vast uncertainty affiliated with early-stage, high-growth startups, 
imposes a considerable challenge when selecting likely winners from losers and the ‘lemons’ problem 
(Akerlof 1970) applies for incubators the same way as for private investors.  
 
 Case 1. Technological Incubators Program Case 2. VIGO Accelerator Program 
Screening • Conducted by private, for-profit 
organizations, approved by 
government 
• Standardized procedures 
• Assisted by external experts 
• Conducted by private, for-profit 
organizations 
• No standardized procedures 
• External expertise is not used  
Investment 
criteria 
• Large market, disruptive idea 
• Some technology confirmation 
preferred 
• Emphasis on team 
• Large market, disruptive ideas 
• Emphasis on team 
 
Timing and fit • Companies should have a ‘flaw’ that 
incubators can target 
• Companies should become ‘investor 
ready’ within incubation period 
• Incubator-company match required 
• Companies should have a ‘flaw’ that 
incubators can target 
• Incubator-company match required 
•  
 
There were some slight differences in the two programs in terms of screening, in which the Israeli 
program appeared to utilize a more rigid process. However, both screening procedures were quite 
comprehensive and mainly undertaken by individuals in the incubators. Risk/reward assessments were 
also implicitly present in both programs: large market potential and a differentiated product represent 
possible reward, while uncertainties in management and technology (mostly Israel), were factors affecting 
the perceived risk. Such assessments are somewhat consistent with venture capital evaluations methods 
(Tyebjee & Bruno 1984).Thus, aligned with Shane (2009) and Mason & Brown (2013), using similar 
methods and having comparable expertise, incubator managers are likely to be as capable evaluators as 
venture capitalists, but not necessarily any better. However, it seemed apparent that both programs could 
tolerate a high degree of uncertainty, especially as experienced teams can be accepted based on a slide 
deck alone. This raises the question of why the incubators can select likely winners from a pool of firms 
that is perceived as ‘too risky’ by venture capitalists.   
 
It can be argued that governmental funding functions as leverage to allow the incubators to operate at the 
same level of risk as venture capitalists, but it does not affect the inherent uncertainty of the companies. 
However, incubators seem to be more concerned about how post-investment activities can grow the 
companies, rather than what is certain and what is not. Whereas investors in later stages would ask, ‘is this 
venture a likely winner’ (Mason et al. 1996), incubator managers reasoning is better explained as ‘can we 
make this venture a winner’.  
 
Therefore, the potential post-investment activities serve as an entry criterion in the pre-investment phase. 
Incubator managers are deliberately looking for ‘flaws’ for which they can make a contribution, and these 
flaws are related to the level of uncertainty within the dimensions of market readiness, technology 
readiness or management readiness. For example, for cases in which investors would say, «Ok, this seems 
all good except this one fundamental ‘flaw’. Go fix it, then come back again» (Mason et al. 1996), 
incubator managers might be willing to tolerate this. However, the incubator managers need to believe that, 
given available financial resources and their own capabilities, the company can reach its next fundable 
milestone within the incubation period. Thus, it needs to be a right level of uncertainty related to the 
companies and a fit between this uncertainty and the capabilities of the incubator managers.  
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This might imply that there is a ‘window of uncertainty’, in which the timing is right for incubation. If a 
company has too many ‘flaws’, it may not become investor ready along all dimensions of investor 
readiness, thereby failing to bridge the financial gap.  
 
Note that a lower limit of accepted uncertainty was observed. This is apparent due to the fact that (1) 
ventures at such ‘low’ risk level appear not to have the need for specialized capabilities the incubators 
have to offer, and (2) that the cost of acquiring shares in ventures close to the financing benchmark are not 
affordable for incubators. 
 
It is likely that the acceptance of a ‘flaw’ affects the agency problems that is acknowledged to impede the 
investment process for new ventures (Sahlman 1990; Hall & Lerner 2009). The incubators outspoken risk-
tolerance may allow firms to adopt a more ‘honest’ approach, making it less necessary to engage in 
opportunistic behavior that can adversely affect the perceived quality of the venture. If the entrepreneur’s 
information about the firm is perceived as more realistic, thereby more credible, it will help the investors 
to distinguish between good firms and ‘lemons’. This is aligned with the underlying purpose of both 
programs, as the governmental funding is supposed to increase incubator managers’ risk tolerance. 
Furthermore, more open communication in the pre-investment phase can reduce the risk of unpleasant 
surprises about the situation of portfolio companies in the post-investment phase, thus reducing the need 
for extensive monitoring (Van Osnabrugge 2000). 
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How incubators ‘make winners’ by reducing uncertainty 
Entrepreneurial activities and rent seeking lead to a need of investments that are characterized by 
uncertainty, in which the outcomes and distribution are unknown (Alvarez 2007; Knight 1921 reffered in 
Sørheim et al. 2011). New, especially technology based ventures, have problems raising funding because 
of the vast uncertainty (and information asymmetries) present in the financing process (Sørheim et al. 
2011). Therefore a need is present for entrepreneurs to reduce the uncertainty in their company to a level 
that investors can accept, thereby becoming ‘investor ready’ (Douglas & Shepherd 2002). 
 
Both programs reduce uncertainty in their portfolio companies through provision of business support and 
network mediation, which contribute, and often aim to, make these ventures investor ready. The support 
provided generally targets the ‘flaw’ of the companies when they enter the program. Typically, there is 
uncertainty related to whether the technology works or whether there is a market. Through milestone 
achievements, the tailored support contributes to generate trustworthy information about the state of the 
portfolio company.   
 
 Case 1. Technological Incubators Program Case 2. VIGO Accelerator Program 
Resource 
allocation 
• 8-10 employees per incubator 
• ~8 firms per incubator 
• 24 month incubation period 
• 2-4 employees per incubator 
• 6-8 firms per incubator 
• 18-24 month incubation period 
Approach to 
support 
• Pro-active and continuous 
• Consulting support 
• Strategic advise 
• Pro-active and continuous 
• Operational support 
• Strategic support 
Reducing 
technology 
uncertainty 
• Technical facilities in-house 
• Technical experts in-house 
• Not generally emphasized 
 
Reducing  
market uncertainty 
• Provide network to market 
stakeholders 
• Provide market specific information 
• Specific focus on international 
markets 
• Strategic support 
Reducing 
management 
uncertainty 
• Incubator recruiting managerial 
supplements or replacements 
• Assist in recruitment of 
management supplements 
• Incubator management takes 
company management roles.  
Focus • Administrative services • An ‘extra hand’ 
 
In essence, the overall focus and content of the provided business support was very much alike in both 
cases. The most substantial difference between the cases appeared to be in the actual approach of the 
support.  
Approach of support 
Both programs provide proactive and continuous support, meaning incubator management would 
proactively engage in the firm’s activities, focusing efforts on the ongoing development needs of the firm 
and providing continuous “business critique”. However, there appeared to be a clear distinction in terms of 
how involved the incubator managements were in the companies: the Israeli incubator managers provided 
mostly consulting and strategic advice, whereas the Finnish incubator managers provided ‘hands on’ 
operational support, for example by taking a managerial role in the company for a limited time period, 
taking charge of the company as a whole or specific strategic areas such as internationalization or sales & 
marketing. Drawing on Bergek & Norrman (2008), we can describe the distinction between the two 
approaches: the  incubator managers in Israel would see themselves as ‘external facilitators of a process 
that is primarily managed by the firms themselves’, whereas the Finnish incubator managers would see 
themselves as ‘managers of the incubation process itself’. 
 
Incubators in both programs tend to focus on a similar, relatively low number of companies, which might 
indicate that they spend a similar amount of time on supporting each of their companies. This can be 
explained by the Finnish incubators in periods spending up to half a week on a single firm, while the 
Israeli support seem to be more continuous support throughout the incubation period, interacting with and 
providing counseling to a larger number of firms on a daily basis.   
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Activities reducing uncertainty 
In both cases, contributions from the incubators were present along the dimensions of technology, market, 
and management uncertainty. There was greater focus on technology support in the Israeli program, which 
can be explained by the nature of the technical development in medical- and life science industries, as 
opposed to the nature of technical development in the software-industry observed in the Finnish program. 
Market uncertainty was in both programs reduced by providing access to market information, or 
(indirectly reduced) by connecting the portfolio companies to market actors, thereby getting the 
companies closer to market confirmation. Rather than undertaking management coaching, incubators in 
both programs reduced the management uncertainty through supplementing (or replacing) team members.  
 
Therefore, it seems that the incubators can be regarded as a version of an investor readiness program 
(Mason & Harrison 2001), as it reduce uncertainty in technology, market and management, thereby 
increasing the level of investor readiness in these dimensions (Douglas & Shepherd 2002). In general, 
there was a strong emphasize on focusing all activities, whether performed by the company or incubator 
management, on conducting tasks that would increase the quality and value of the company in the eyes of 
potential investors.  
Focus 
Common for both cases is that incubator managers were able to identify the most important activities 
needed to become investor ready, thereby ‘focusing’ on what is required to become investor ready. In that 
way, scarce resources are allocated in an efficient manner.  
 
The importance of focus was explicitly emphasized in both cases, especially in the Israeli program. 
Providing a comprehensive ‘umbrella of professional services’, the Israeli portfolio companies were able 
to focus on developing the company. The Finnish incubators tried to achieve this as well through 
providing an ‘extra hand’ when the companies were busy with value-creating activities. Such services 
thereby contribute to faster reduction of uncertainty in the companies.     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Companies receiving focused support inside a demand-side initiative are able to become investor ready more 
efficiently. The length of the arrow illustrates resource expenditure. Firms outside the program may ‘crash’ because of 
resource constraints; all though the move in the right direction, they are not focused enough to bridge the ‘gap’ with the 
available resources. 
Therefore, portfolio companies in the incubators were able to become investor ready more efficiently than 
firms outside the program. Firms outside the program are more likely to spend their resources less 
efficiently, typically over-emphasizing technology readiness, not recognizing that the firm must be ready 
on all dimensions to be attractive to investors (Douglas & Shepherd 2002).  
 
Relating the support to ‘Knightian uncertainty’ (Knight 1921 reffered in Sørheim et al. 2011), the 
activities conducted contribute to companies either obtaining more information (e.g. about external market 
factors) or to achieve milestones that create information about the viability of the company (e.g. through 
prototype testing or initial sales). Thus, information is made available, or even generated, so that 
uncertainty is transformed to risk that investors can relate to.  
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How incubators ‘sell winners’ by reducing information asymmetries 
Information asymmetries are hampering the investment process for potentially good firms, either because 
of entrepreneurs and investors unawareness of new ventures, or because of investors difficulties with 
interpreting the quality or intentions of the new company (Sahlman 1990; Hall & Lerner 2009), thereby 
causing the ‘lemons’ problem (Akerlof 1970). After having picked the most promising firms, reduced 
their uncertainty and made them investor ready through incubation, it is in the interest of the incubators 
that the company receives new investments for further growth. In this role, the incubators have more 
information about the quality of the portfolio companies than the investors. Our study of the programs in 
Finland and Israel indicate that incubators, or incubator managers in particular, play a key role in reducing 
these information asymmetries. 
 
 Case 1. Technological Incubators Program Case 2. VIGO Accelerator Program 
Establishing 
information flow 
• Connect portfolio companies with 
investors 
• Connect portfolio companies 
with investors 
• International focus 
Improving 
information flow 
• Assist preparation of presentations • Assist preparation of 
presentation 
• Incubator managers join 
investor meetings and 
negotiations 
Transferring 
information about 
quality 
• Incubator managers are a trusted 
source of information 
• Incubator program is well reputed 
• Easy access to VCs (meetings) 
• Support provided give investors 
confidence of a projects viability 
• Incubator reputation lead to 
increased credibility for 
company 
• Incubator reputation allow for 
less scrutiny when obtaining 
public funding 
Establishing and improving information flow  
In both programs, both incubator managers and companies expressed that the incubators provided 
significant value to the companies by connecting them to possible investors in their network, thereby 
reducing the transaction costs related to the search for an investor (Nightingale et al. 2009). The Finnish 
program appeared to have a stronger emphasis on international investors.   
 
Both programs were also involved in preparing presentations. Some were in fact even holding 
presentations on behalf of and/or together with their portfolio companies. In this way, assuming the 
incubator management is more proficient at presenting than the entrepreneurs, the information flow 
between companies and investors are improved and clarified, thereby reducing information asymmetries. 
Information about quality 
Investors do utilize social ties as a mean to transfer information about investment opportunities. The 
Israeli incubators in particular, expressed that they were a trusted source of information to the investors, 
which might be a result of their track record or their personal social ties. Regardless, the agency problems 
are reduced if the information that the incubator provides about the quality of the venture is more 
trustworthy than the information the company could provide on its own (Shane & Stuart 2002).  
 
The VIGO accelerator companies clearly expressed that the accelerator companies added credibility to the 
companies when interacting with investors. Such clear observations of the company perspective were not 
made in the Israeli program, nor where they rejected. The track record of the Israeli program and the 
indication that the incubators easily could get the attention of other investors may indicate a certain status. 
Then the Israeli portfolio companies will benefit from this status, as the status of a company can be 
derived from the status of the exchange partner (Podolny 1994). The reason for this spill-over effect is 
however not apparent: 
 
As Stuart et al. (1999) suggest, if there is a perceived association between evaluative ability and 
prominence, being selected by a prominent incubator will in itself be an endorsement to a portfolio 
company. This association can be assumed to be present as both VIGO-accelerators and Israeli incubators 
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are investors whose business models rely on being able to choose potential good firms. On the other hand, 
it may also be the result of the incubators’ recognized ‘way of doing things”; the quality of the support 
provided to their portfolio companies that leaves investors with an impression of the companies being part 
of a larger organization.  
 
Both countries have a track record of producing successful startups: The Israeli program generates high 
amounts of private investments and some incubators have enjoyed numerous exits. The VIGO program in 
Finland is starting to see that their efforts are bearing fruit through some large international successes and 
increased investments from international companies. Such a track record, regardless of it being a result of 
the ability to pick the promising companies or the ability to develop these, has a positive effect on the 
status of the incubator companies. If there is an association between the status of a new venture and how 
an investor interprets its quality, being associated with an incubator with a track record will signal quality 
that reduce the adverse selection problem arising from information asymmetries.  
 
Both incubation programs reduce information asymmetries through functioning as a mediator, connecting 
companies with investors or improving the information flow between them through presentational 
assistance. However, less obvious findings revolve around how the prominent incubators have an effect on 
the lemons problem: through explicitly providing (trusted) information or implicitly signaling the quality 
of the portfolio companies, the investors can more easily interpret the abilities of these firms compared to 
other less able firms. In this way, the prominent incubator has the role as a guarantor of quality, thereby 
mitigating the lemons problem. 
 
Cultural and contextual considerations 
Many governmental programs have failed because of policy makers incautiously replicating successful 
programs from elsewhere by framing their goals such as «how do we replicate the success of Silicon 
Valley» (Armour & Cumming 2006), failing to considering the context in which it is implemented 
(Rasmussen & Sørheim 2012a).  
 
The Israeli people have an entrepreneurial mindset, which is grounded in both history and culture. First of 
all, the country has had very little natural resources. This has given the people a notion of a need to “think 
outside the box” in order to survive. Children are from an early age encouraged to challenge the existing 
and obvious. In entrepreneurship, failure is perceived as an opportunity to learn and is not something that 
should be avoided. Secondly, hostile countries surround Israel, which has generated a need for 
sophisticated military technology, also applied for non-military purposes. The neighbors are excluded as 
potential partners or markets, which have created a need to direct attention to international markets and to 
technologies that do not have high shipping costs. These factors have put Israel in an excellent position to 
excel in the growing knowledge and innovation based economy (Senor & Singer 2011). As stated by an 
incubator manager in the TIP-program: «The DNA of the Israeli entrepreneur would be quite hard to 
replicate».  
 
The Israeli problem-solving mindset and efforts to develop sophisticated technology in the military are 
factors that, in addition to significant governmental intervention since the early 90s, have contributed to 
Israel becoming one of the most intensive hi-tech clusters in the world (Avnimelech et al. 2007). Very 
high R&D expenditure (#1 globally as percentage of GDP, (The World Bank 2011)), combined with 
entrepreneurial-friendly people, generates a sufficient deal-flow for the incubators. The incubators also get 
access to sufficient human capital to run the incubators. As described by the TIP-manager «It’s not 
difficult to find good people for incubator staff. We have lots of them in this market, people have already 
been in a few startups, they were VCs, they have gained the necessary experience». 
 
Finland does not have an equally strong culture for entrepreneurship as Israel. Before the VIGO-program 
was established, a study used the word «paradox» to explain Finland’s unsatisfactory performance in high-
growth entrepreneurship, despite the presence of structural conditions that usually favor such activity 
(Autio 2009). Finland ranks 2nd after Israel in terms of R&D expenditure as percentage of GDP and has 
had an emphasis on engineering-intensive industries (The World Bank 2011). However, Finns are 
typically risk averse, and entrepreneurs has generally had low growth-aspirations (Ruohonen & Oy 2007; 
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Autio 2009). There was also a lack of people with business experience that were willing to support 
aspiring companies with growth ambitions. As described by a representative in the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy: «…we analyzed that in Finland, we do have enough experienced business 
people, but they are not interested in startups. They want to sit in boards of big companies, but not in 
startups». 
 
Both countries have the structural conditions, in terms of emphasize on R&D and technology, for high-
growth entrepreneurship in place, which would imply that both programs would enjoy a sufficient deal-
flow to the incubators. However, as the culture differs significantly, the Israeli program should have better 
access to qualified people, both to run high-growth companies and to run incubators. This explains that, in 
addition to promoting high-growth entrepreneurial companies, the VIGO program has a specific objective 
to link these companies to internationally experienced business professionals and strengthen the high 
growth capabilities in Finland in general (Autio et al. 2013). In Israel, as it is today, there does not seem to 
be a need for the government to facilitate the development of international growth capabilities, as these 
exist as a result of the context and culture of the country.  However, despite the major contextual 
differences in these countries, the two programs appear to be very similar. 
 
The importance of industry experts 
Based on findings in this study, the incubator management appears to be a critical success factor for the 
programs. First, they need to be able to distinguish the firms that can become high-growth ventures from 
the ‘lemons’, which in itself is a difficult task (Shane 2009; Hackett & Dilts 2004b). This study has 
revealed that incubator managers, since investing at such an early stage, identify and accept a ‘flaw’ in the 
business concepts and recognize whether something can be done with this flaw, and whether they have the 
capabilities to do so. Secondly, the incubators have a clear objective to develop the companies to become 
investor ready. They know what investors expect in terms of market readiness, technology readiness and 
management readiness, and recognize what their portfolio companies should focus on to reach this level of 
readiness. Finally, the incubator managers leverage personal networks to identify and approach potential 
investors for their portfolio companies. Experienced individuals with a track record or a certain status will 
also improve how investors perceive the quality of the portfolio companies.  
 
It seems apparent that, in order to successfully conduct these tasks and to make a contribution, the 
incubator management will need to understand business, have experience as an entrepreneur or investors, 
and have a network to utilize. It seems doubtful that someone without such experience, for example 
government officials, will be able to successfully make the necessary assessments and contributions. As 
put by a representative in the Finnish Ministry of the Employment and Economy: «Government agency 
officials, like me, if they start to make direct investments in companies, it would be disastrous.»  
 
 
 
 
32 
The importance of government funding 
This study has emphasized the importance of the activities conducted by the incubators in the two 
programs. However, financial resources are crucial for companies that wish to grow (Carpenter & 
Petersen 2002b). It is therefore important to point out that the incubators are not just measures to obtain 
finance at a later stage, but also direct sources of funding. The activities undertaken in the incubators in 
order to achieve milestones that trigger funding from other sources require access to finance. The 
incubators in both programs invest money from their own balance in the companies, but it is not enough to 
make a significant contribution. The governments provide the additional funding that is necessary to 
develop the companies to a level, from which the market can finance the companies on its own.  
 
How this is done differs between the two programs. The companies in the Israeli TIP-program receives 
funding as a direct result of being accepted to an incubator, although with the Office of Chief Scientist 
approving the incubators decision, while being accepted by a VIGO-accelerator provides a fast-track to 
governmental funding through TEKES. These governmental funding sources provide a significant amount 
of finance to the companies, up to 600 000 USD in the Israeli program and up to 1M EURO in the Finnish. 
In Israel, in which the deal-flow experienced by incubators is very high, the program manager in the OCS 
believed that up to four times as many companies than currently accepted for incubation were of a quality 
that made them eligible for incubation. However, sacrificing the size of the grants each company receives 
to be able to support more firms was deliberately avoided. As stated by the program manager:  
 
«You have to be careful here. I will go to the extreme: Take the 50M USD that I have and divide it 
to 1000 companies. The amount of money that each company will get is not enough to do anything 
significant. Half a million USD is the minimum if you want a company to reach a real milestone 
that will attract private investors.» 
 
Significant funding also appeared to be one of the main reasons for why entrepreneurs applied to the 
incubator programs: 
 
«To be bluntly honest, I think the main thing that got us interested in the system was the ease and 
access to the government funding through Tekes.» (Company CEO) 
 
«Nothing can be done without the money.» (Company CEO) 
 
Furthermore, in accordance with the objectives of the programs, many of the entrepreneurs did in fact try 
to raise money elsewhere prior to joining the incubator program, however unsuccessfully: 
 
«We tried to raise money from venture capital [prior to joining the incubator], but were not able 
to.» (Company CEO) 
 
The governmental funding is not only important for the companies to meet their milestones. It also serves 
as an incentive structure to attract experienced individuals to get involved and invest in early stage 
companies. It is not rational for private investors to invest in the earliest stages of new ventures (Murray 
2007). Significant governmental funding makes industry experts perceive running an incubator and invest 
in early stage companies as a good business opportunity. Regardless of whether the governmental funding 
is granted directly upon incubator admission or made available through a fast-track to a grant later on in 
the process, it provides the incubators the possibility to invest early on without being extensively diluted. 
The provision of “free money” makes it possible to reduce the uncertainty in the companies, thereby 
increasing the value of the companies to an extent that would not be possible without governmental 
funding. This was confirmed by two of the Israeli incubator managers:  
 
«I think again they (government) give very, very generous matching financing in the incubators 
and our investment has leveraged a lot. But to do this without the leverage is very difficult 
considering the high risk we have.» 
 
«The money from the government is the game changer if the industry we love will survive or not.» 
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Holistic value chain 
Many policy makers create funding systems based on ad-hoc initiatives rather than holistic planning, 
failing to consider the value chain of public and private actors they are trying to copy (Rasmussen & 
Sørheim 2012a). In both cases the incubator program was interlinked with other programs, forming a 
holistic ‘value chain’ of governmental instruments. This ensures that if a project succeeds one step in the 
value chain, the necessary support to move it further down the chain is accessible, effectively until 
uncertainty is reduced sufficiently to attract private venture capital. 
 
Figure 3 and Error! Reference source not found. illustrate the value chains of funding schemes in 
Finland and Israel. Each box represents a program; its vertical position represents the uncertainty of the 
companies it targets and the width of the boxes represents the relative amount of companies that are 
included. Both Finnish and Israeli government agencies offer public proof-of-concept funding as a first 
step in the value chain. In Finland, TEKES provides a «Planning for global growth» grant, typically at 
$70.000 and 75% of total costs, as well as an R&D grant/loan. Public seed funding is offered through the 
YIC program, where VIGO projects enjoy priority treatment via an exclusive fast track (Maijanen 2014). 
 
 
 
In Israel proof-of-concept funding was offered through the TNUFA grant, typically $50.000 covering 85% 
of eligible costs. Public seed funding is exclusively offered through the TIC program. Furthermore, 
public/private seed funding is offered through the HEZNEK seed fund, in which government grants of up 
to 50% are given to match private investments (not limited to TIP companies) (Ministry of Economy 
2014).  
Figure 3: Value Chain of governmental funding schemes in Finland 
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In both cases supply-side measures were implemented, thereby ‘pushing’ the financial benchmark to an 
appropriate level. In Finland, hybrid VC schemes and BA co-investment programs were launched, 
whereas fiscal incentives were given to private investors in Israel. Some might argue that governmental 
funding, as incentives for private investors to run incubators, make it appropriate to classify the two 
programs as supply-side programs instead of demand-side program. Indeed, the government increases the 
available pool of finance to early stage start-ups and increases the uncertainty tolerance for private 
investors (that invest through incubators). However, the purpose of the program is to increase the 
attractiveness perceived by private investors that invest without governmental leverage, and private 
incubators are used as a mean to achieve this. Thus, the authors argue that the program should be 
classified as a demand-side program. 
 
What is important to notice is the interdependence of the initiatives. The incubator programs, or ‘premium 
investor ready schemes’, make up the very core of the value chain. However, they would not be able to 
function without the risk-reducing financial governmental support from OCS/YIC. Furthermore, they 
would most likely not enjoy a high quality deal flow of projects if it were not for the early-stage public 
proof-of-concept grants offered in both countries. On the other hand, the early-stage grants would not 
make any large impact if it was not for the premium program to take the best projects and continue to 
reduce uncertainty. Furthermore, all initiatives in both countries are staged, meaning that for each new 
initiative, fewer firms are accepted, and more resources are spent per accepted firm, ensuring that enough 
uncertainty is reduced to tell whether the firm is good or a ‘lemon’. 
A model for governmental intervention 
Promising high-growth companies, which have the potential to produce considerable benefits for the 
domestic economy (Murray 2007), face impediments raising an adequate amount of funding because of 
information asymmetries and uncertainty (Sørheim et al. 2011; Carpenter & Petersen 2002a; Alvarez 
2007). Thus, governmental intervention is justified in order to close the financial gap, which can be done 
through both demand-side and supply-side intervention (Cressy & Olofsson 1997). It is important to find 
the right balance between focusing on producing high quality start-ups and making sure the private equity 
market has enough financial strength to obtain and further grow the high quality start-ups (Nightingale et 
al. 2009). However, governments have recently recognized that financial market seem to have a sufficient 
amount of investable capital, but is unable to find enough high-quality companies to invest in (Lundström 
& Stevenson 2005; Mason & Kwok 2010). Thus, existing demand-side initiatives fail to reduce the 
uncertainty to a level that investors can accept. This gap can be illustrated as in Figure 5: The companies 
in existing programs are by investors perceived as question marks. Apart from the few obvious good 
companies, it is not possible to distinguish the good companies from the bad.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The financial gap. Demand-side initiatives are unable to reduce the uncertainty in 
start-up companies to a level that investors can accept. 
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This study has illustrated how demand-side programs can bridge the financial gap through leveraging for-
profit private incubators. These incubator programs function as “premium” demand-side programs, which 
focus on developing the most promising companies to a point where the market can obtain and further 
develop the firms without governmental intervention. The incubators in this study do so by being able to 
select promising firms, identifying and addressing the uncertainties that must be reduced for investors to 
perceive them as attractive, and finally reducing the information asymmetries between their companies 
and potential investors. To successfully conduct these activities, the incubators need to be run by 
individuals with business experienced, preferably as entrepreneurs or as investors. The catalyst for this 
process is significant governmental funding, that first reduces the risk for experienced individuals and 
attracts them to operate and invest through incubators, and secondly, makes it possible for companies to 
achieve significant (uncertainty-reducing) milestones that trigger additional private investments. The 
incubator programs were typically implemented in a chain of programs, in which other programs provided 
smaller grants to a larger number of more uncertain companies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Implications 
Policy makers 
First, policy makers need to adopt a holistic perspective, and assess whether a lack of high growth firms is 
a result of a lack of financial strength on the supply side, or a lack of quality firms on the demand-side. 
We have provided a conceptual model that can help policymakers understand demand/supply-side 
dynamics, identify constraining factors and design schemes thereafter.  
 
Second, there should be a value chain of programs that address different stages in the life cycle of early 
stage companies. Only implementing incubator programs that focus on promising companies, such as 
those in Israel and Finland, will not necessarily produce the desired outcome. The incubators need a deal 
flow of a certain quality to choose firms from, which, for example early-stage governmental grants, can 
contribute to providing.  
 
Third, incubators with an objective to develop high growth firms need to be able to reduce the uncertainty 
for companies and information asymmetries between companies and investors. This requires capabilities 
that government officials, or others without business experience, are unlikely to possess. Policy-makers 
should appreciate the need of business capabilities in demand-side programs, and build incentive 
structures that attract experienced individuals to get involved and invest in start-up companies in a very 
early stage.  
 
     Industry Professionals 
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significant governmental funding and competence from experienced professionals. 
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Fourth, policy makers need to acknowledge that a significant amount of funding is necessary to produce 
significant contributions for the companies supported by public funding. This suggests that it is necessary 
to prioritize a smaller number of firms, even if this exclude a group of companies that seeks governmental 
funding. If policymakers are unwilling to prioritize, there is a risk that the existing resources are spread 
too thin, ending up with a large group of companies without resources to develop their companies to 
become “investor ready”.   
Investors 
First, investor input can help policymakers make better and well-informed decisions on how to allocate 
resources. If there is a lack of quality firms, investors should promote allocation of resources to demand-
side initiatives, instead of asking for more investable and risk reducing capital to invest in existing firms.  
 
Second, this study shows that if considerable public funding is available, investments in early stage 
companies combined with significant managerial involvement can represent a viable business model.  
Implications for the Norwegian context 
The Norwegian VC-industry may be categorized as relatively active investors in both the ‘venture’ and 
‘expansion’ stage of the firm life cycle. Since 1998 the Norwegian government has set up several national 
and regional seed funds, attempting to increase investment activities in this stage. In 2014, two new 
private/public seed funds were created, managed by private seed fund ProVenture (oil & gas) and Alliance 
Venture Spring (ICT). Each fund has a total size of 500 MNOK (Innovation Norway 2013). These 
governmental supply-side measures should imply that the supply-side does have the financial strength to 
obtain a larger number of promising companies. 
 
However few ‘seed’ stage investments are being conducted by Norwegian investors. In recent years, 
Norwegian seed funds have been criticized for not following their ‘mandate’ of investing in early-stage 
ventures, but rather investing in firms on the same terms as traditional venture capitalists (Tillvaxtanalys 
2011). In 2013, 17 MNOK was invested in seed stage firms by Norwegian investors (NVCA 2014). 
 
There are several governmental agencies supporting the demand-side, including Innovation Norway, The 
Norwegian Research Council and SIVA. These actors provide firm support at the very beginning of the 
firm life cycle, typically through proof-of-concept grants and infrastructure. In theory, these initiatives are 
claimed to cover the ‘value chain’ from firm birth until the private equity market takes over. 
 
In essence, the Norwegian context is characterized by considerable governmental supply-side intervention 
as well as early stage demand-side support in the form of grants and infrastructure. However, no firms are 
particularly prioritized in any of the schemes. Therefore, there is reason to believe that there is enough 
financial strength in the market place, but Norwegian investors perceive a lack of quality firms to invest in. 
On the other side, Norwegian startups are lacking resources to reduce uncertainty beyond early-stage 
proof-of-concept grants. 
 
Therefore, there is a reason to believe that the implementation of a ‘premium initiative’, which priorities 
the most promising companies and provides incentives for involvement of private actors in the very early 
stages, can improve the financing situations and enhance the growth of promising new ventures. The 
authors recommend that a pilot project should be initiated. 
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Further research 
This case study has had a holistic focus to reveal different aspects of the incubation process, of which 
some can be investigated in detail in further research. An important finding is that the incubators in this 
study reduce uncertainty and information asymmetries for their portfolio companies. However, the 
weighed impact of each of these contributions, on the probability to receive investments are however 
uncertain.  
 
Another interesting finding is that incubators seem to signal on behalf of their incubator companies, 
something the companies may benefit from when interacting with investors. However, both the reason for 
this effect, and the actual outcome of it, is somewhat unclear: 
• Companies may believe that they receive credibility through their affiliation with a prominent 
incubator. But how does this actually influence the decision making of potential investors? 
• Is the signaling of quality a result of the track record of the individuals in the incubator, of the 
incubator itself, or is it a result of how outside actors perceive that the provision of support 
increase the robustness of the companies? What is the weighted impact on perceived quality for 
these potential reasons?  
 
The programs studied provide significant funding to a small number of promising firms. However, there 
were indications that many firms were perceived to be good enough for the program, but were declined 
incubation due to budget limitations and an emphasis on providing enough funds to those that get support. 
It is therefore likely that opportunities are lost when only the most promising firms are supported. Finding 
the optimal balance between providing enough support to each firm, so that it is significant, and 
supporting enough firms, so losing opportunities is avoided, can serve as an interesting issue for further 
research. 
 
The incubators are profit-seeking organizations that are likely to pick the most promising firms, even 
though they are co-investing with public funds, which might imply a risk for admitting companies that 
would have succeeded without their contributions. There were mixed signals in this study on whether this 
is the case or not: Some companies reported that their experience made them less dependent on the 
support that was available, some incubator managers said they would accept firms that they perceived as 
less risky, while others insisted that high risk was required. Further research could investigate more 
thoroughly if companies in such “premium”-programs are of a quality that the market would have 
financed them without government intervention.  
Conclusion 
This study has examined how incubators, as a demand-side initiative to foster high-growth companies, (1) 
are able to “pick winners” at a very early stage of the venture process, (2) “make winners” by reducing the 
uncertainty of the venture, making them “investor ready”, and (3) “sell winners” through reducing 
information asymmetries between the ventures and the companies. The incubators select companies for 
incubation based on a fit between company weaknesses and their specific capabilities. They identify and 
address uncertainties in the companies through value-adding activities, and signal venture quality so 
investors finally are able to distinguish the good companies from less able firms. This is enabled through 
significant amounts of governmental funding that enable uncertainty-reducing activities as well as attract 
the required expertise to get involved and invest in the new ventures. 
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